

U.S.-JAPAN RELATIONS: ENDURING TIES, RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

HEARING BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIA, THE PACIFIC AND THE GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS

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CONTENTS

	Page
WITNESSES	
Mr. Joseph R. Donovan, Jr., Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, U.S. Department of State	14
Mr. Michael Schiffer, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian & Pacific, Security Affairs (East Asia), U.S. Department of Defense	23
Sheila A. Smith, Ph.D., Senior Fellow for Japan Studies, Council on Foreign Relations	49
Michael Auslin, Ph.D., Director of Japan Studies, The American Enterprise Institute	62
LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING	
The Honorable Eni F.H. Faleomavaega, a Representative in Congress from American Samoa, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Asia, the Pacific and the Global Environment: Prepared statement	4
The Honorable Donald A. Manzullo, a Representative in Congress from the State of Illinois: Prepared statement	8
The Honorable Diane E. Watson, a Representative in Congress from the State of California: Prepared statement	13
Mr. Joseph R. Donovan, Jr.: Prepared statement	17
Mr. Michael Schiffer: Prepared statement	26
Sheila A. Smith, Ph.D.: Prepared statement	54
Michael Auslin, Ph.D.: Prepared statement	64
APPENDIX	
Hearing notice	78
Hearing minutes	79
The Honorable Christopher H. Smith, a Representative in Congress from the State of New Jersey: Statement/questions	80

U.S.-JAPAN RELATIONS: ENDURING TIES, RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

WEDNESDAY, MARCH 17, 2010

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIA, THE PACIFIC
AND THE GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:41 p.m. in room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, the Honorable Eni F. H. Faleomavaega, (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. The subcommittee will come to order. My apologies to our witnesses for being a little late this afternoon, but we do welcome them. And without any objection, all the statements of our witnesses will be made part of the record.

I will begin by giving my opening statement. Then my good friend, the ranking member of our subcommittee, Mr. Manzullo, will give his opening statement, and then we will proceed from there.

This is a hearing on United States-Japan relations. I believe this is the first time that we have had the hearing. Hopefully there will be more to come.

This year marks the 50th anniversary of the signing of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between Japan and the United States. That treaty forms the bedrock of our bilateral relationship, which in turn plays an indispensable role in ensuring security and prosperity for the United States and Japan as well as the broader Asia-Pacific region and throughout the world. As Article 6 of the treaty notes, one of its major purposes is to “contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security in the Far East.”

The advent of new governments in both countries offers us a unique opportunity to expand and invigorate both the security alliance and our close economic, diplomatic and political ties in the face of new regional and global challenges. Our two government witnesses today are involved in senior-level discussions with their Japanese counterparts on deepening and expanding the alliance to encompass greater cooperation in disaster relief, humanitarian assistance, climate change, cyber security, terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and other issues. In this important dialogue both sides are guided by a shared respect for democracy and freedom, by a mutual interest in successfully adapting to the realignment of the region’s great powers and by the enduring ties we have forged over the last 65 years.

Clearly, we have encountered some difficulties in relations since the election of the Democratic Party of Japan last August. But we should be mindful that the Democratic Party of Japan never governed previously, as with one brief interruption, the Liberal Democratic Party ruled Japan for more than half a century.

As those of us in Washington should be acutely aware, getting a new administration up to speed can take time. More to the point, most of the issues on which the press has reported so breathlessly are relatively minor when viewed in the context of the breadth and depth of our bilateral relationship. The fact that certain Toyota models sometimes accelerate unexpectedly is a mechanical problem, not a diplomatic issue. And last week's acknowledgment by Japan's foreign minister of the existence of secret cold war agreements was a welcome fulfillment of the Democratic Party of Japan's campaign pledge to promote greater governmental transparency. In my opinion, secret agreements that would allow military operations by U.S. forces based in Japan in case of an emergency on the Korean Peninsula, and to have Tokyo spend some \$20 million to help restore former U.S. military areas in Okinawa to farmland should have been made public decades ago.

The more problematic secret agreement that gave tacit permission for U.S. nuclear-armed warships to make calls at Japanese ports and transit through Japanese territorial waters—which would appear to have contravened Japan's three non-nuclear principles not to make, own or allow entry of nuclear weapons—was made public decades ago. Edwin Reischauer, our Ambassador to Japan in the mid-1960s, discussed those port calls in an open press conference in 1980. Ten years later, President Bush, Bush 41, announced the withdrawal of tactical nuclear weapons from U.S. naval ships, rendering the secret pact moot.

I believe both the United States and Japan should welcome Tokyo's new willingness to acknowledge historical truths and indeed encourage the Hatoyama government to do so in other areas.

In any case, the most significant issue between our two countries is Japan's decision to reexamine the agreement to relocate the U.S. Marine Corps Air Station from Futenma to a less populated part of Okinawa.

Two months ago I signed a letter with the chairman and ranking members of the House Foreign Affairs and Armed Services Committees expressing our continued support for the Guam International Agreement of February 2009. In our view any concerns regarding the Futenma Replacement Facility should be addressed through that accord.

As the agreement notes, it is the intent of both parties to reduce the burden on local communities, including those in Okinawa, thereby providing the basis for enhanced public support for the security alliance. It further states, and I quote,

“The relocation of some 8,000 marines and their 9,000 dependents from Okinawa to Guam shall be dependent on tangible progress made by the Government of Japan toward completion of the Futenma Replacement Facility as stipulated in the United States-Japan road map for realignment implementation of 2006.”

I believe all of us who signed the letter recognized that during the campaign, the Democratic Party of Japan pledged to review the base issue. And since the Social Democratic Party, one of the Democratic Party's coalition partners, adamantly opposes the existing relocation plans and insists that the base be moved outside of Japan. The decision by the Prime Minister to put the realignment process on hold after taking office should not have come as a surprise.

After the January Nago mayoral election resulting in the victory of a first-time candidate opposed to the planned relocation, the Okinawa Prefectural Assembly's unanimous approval of a written statement demanding that the base be moved outside the prefecture. The governor of Okinawa's recent hints that he may take a similar position when he campaigns for reelection later this year—the issue has clearly become more volatile locally.

The burdens the Okinawan people have shouldered on behalf of the alliance should not be underestimated. With less than 1 percent of Japan's land area, Okinawa is host to two-thirds of the American forces based in Japan. We should also remember that Okinawa was the sovereign Ryuku Kingdom until it was forcefully annexed by Japan in 1872, and that during the battle of Okinawa, one-third of its inhabitants died. To this day Okinawa remains a vestige of imperialism as it languishes behind the rest of the country economically and educationally, and its people face discrimination throughout Japan.

In dealing with the Futenma relocation issue, we must not neglect this history. Politically we must also recognize that Prime Minister Hatoyama's approval ratings have deteriorated steeply from almost 80 percent when he took office to somewhere between 30 to 40 percent now, largely as a result of financial scandals and uneven leadership. Even worse for the Democratic Party of Japan, only one-quarter of voters say they plan to cast their ballots for the party in July's Upper House elections.

At the same time we must not lose sight of the strategic importance of United States-Japan alliance or allow the Futenma issue to define the bilateral relationship. Japan remains America's most important ally in the Asia-Pacific. Japan is the world's second largest economy if one uses an alternative metric system. Just a few weeks ago it is my understanding that Japan has regained its position as the largest holder of American treasuries, now somewhere around \$769 billion to China's \$755 billion. Japan shares our democratic values and our interest in a prosperous, peaceful, stable and sustainable world. The United States-Japan alliance should and will remain a pivotal strength for both of our countries so long as we address the issues of the day with patience, persistence, flexibility, and understanding between both countries.

That ends my opening statement, and I would now like to turn the time over to my good friend, our ranking member, for his opening statement.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Faleomavaega follows:]

**COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES**

**STATEMENT OF
THE HONORABLE ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA
CHAIRMAN**

**before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIA, THE PACIFIC AND THE
GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT**

U.S.-Japan Relations: Enduring Ties, Recent Developments

March 17, 2010

This year marks the Fiftieth Anniversary of the signing of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between Japan and the United States. That treaty forms the bedrock of our bilateral relationship, which in turn plays an indispensable role in ensuring security and prosperity for the United States and Japan as well as for the broader Asia Pacific and the world. As Article VI of the Treaty notes, one of its major purposes is to contribute to “the maintenance of international peace and security in the Far East.”

The advent of new governments in both countries offers us a unique opportunity to expand and invigorate both the security alliance and our close economic, diplomatic and political ties in the face of new regional and global challenges.

Our two government witnesses today are involved in senior-level discussions with their Japanese counterparts on deepening and expanding the alliance to encompass greater cooperation in disaster relief, humanitarian assistance, climate change, cyber security, terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destructions and other issues.

In this important dialogue, both sides are guided by a shared respect for democracy and freedom, by a mutual interest in successfully adapting to the realignment of the region’s great powers, and by the enduring ties we have forged over the last 65 years.

Clearly, we have encountered some difficulties in relations since the electoral victory of the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) last August. But we should be mindful that the DPJ never governed previously as with one brief interruption, the Liberal Democratic Party ruled Japan for more than half a century. As those of us in Washington should be acutely aware, getting a new Administration up to speed can take time.

More to the point, most of the issues on which the press has reported so breathlessly are relatively minor when viewed in the context of the breadth and depth of the bilateral relationship. The fact that certain Toyota models sometimes accelerate unexpectedly is a mechanical problem, not a diplomatic issue. And last week's acknowledgement by Japan's Foreign Minister of the existence of secret Cold War agreements was a welcome fulfillment of the DPJ's campaign pledge to promote greater governmental transparency.

In my view, the secret agreements to allow military operations by U.S. forces based in the country in case of an emergency on the Korean peninsula, and to have Tokyo spend \$20 million to help restore former U.S. military areas in Okinawa to farmland, should have been made public decades ago.

The more problematic secret agreement that gave tacit permission for U.S. nuclear-armed warships to make calls at Japanese ports and transit through Japanese territorial waters – which would appear to have contravened Japan's three non-nuclear principles not to make, own or allow entry of nuclear weapons – was made public decades ago. Edwin Reischauer, our Ambassador to Japan in the mid-1960s, discussed those port calls in an open press conference in 1981. And ten years later, when George H. W. Bush announced the withdrawal of tactical nuclear weapons from U.S. naval ships, he rendered the secret pact moot.

I believe both the United States and Japan should welcome Tokyo's new willingness to acknowledge historical truths, and indeed encourage the Hatoyama government to do so in other areas.

In any case, the most significant issue between our two countries is Japan's decision to re-examine the agreement to relocate the U.S. Marine Corps Air Station from Futenma to a less populated part of Okinawa. Two months ago, I signed a letter with the Chairmen and Ranking Members of the House Foreign Affairs and Armed Services Committees, expressing our continued support for the Guam International Agreement of February 2009, and our view that any concerns regarding the Futenma Replacement Facility be addressed through that accord.

As the Agreement notes, it is the intent of both parties to “reduce the burden on local communities, including those in Okinawa, thereby providing the basis for enhanced public support for the security alliance.” It further states that, “The relocation [of 8,000 Marines and their 9,000 dependents from Okinawa to Guam] shall be dependent on tangible progress made by the Government of Japan toward completion of the Futenma Replacement Facility as stipulated” in the United States-Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation of 2006.

Yet, I believe all of us who signed the letter recognize that during the campaign, the Democratic Party pledged to review the base issue. And since the Social Democratic Party, one of the DPJ's coalition partners, adamantly opposes the existing relocation plan and insists that the base be moved outside Japan, the decision by the Prime Minister to

put the realignment process on hold after taking office should not have come as a surprise.

After the January Nago mayoral election resulting in the victory of a first-time candidate opposed to the planned relocation, the Okinawa prefectural assembly's unanimous approval of a written statement demanding that the base be moved outside the prefecture, and the Governor of Okinawa's recent hints that he may take a similar position when he campaigns for reelection later this year, the issue has clearly become more volatile locally.

The burdens the Okinawan people have shouldered on behalf of the alliance should not be underestimated. With less than one percent of Japan's land area, Okinawa is host to two-thirds of the American forces based in the country. We should also remember that Okinawa, once the sovereign Ryuku Kingdom, was forcibly annexed by Japan in 1872, and that during the Battle of Okinawa, one-third of its inhabitants died. To this day, Okinawa remains a vestige of imperialism as it languishes behind the rest of the country economically and educationally, and its people face discrimination throughout the Japan.

In dealing with the Futenma relocation issue, we must not neglect this history. Politically, we must also recognize that Prime Minister Hatoyama's approval ratings have deteriorated steeply from almost 80 percent when he took office to 30-40 percent now, largely as a result of financial scandals and uneven leadership. Even worse for the DPJ, only one-quarter of voters say they plan to cast their ballots for the party in July's Upper House elections.

At the same time, we must not lose sight of the strategic importance of the U.S.-Japan alliance or allow the Futenma issue to define the bilateral relationship. Japan remains America's most important ally in the Asia Pacific, is the world's second largest economy (or third if one uses an alternative metric), and just a few weeks ago regained its position as the largest holder of American treasuries at \$769 billion – outpacing China's holdings of \$755 billion, according to Treasury Department numbers.

The country shares our democratic values and our interest in a prosperous, peaceful, stable and sustainable world. The U.S.-Japan alliance should and will remain a pillar of strength for both countries so long as we address the issues of the day with patience, persistence, flexibility and an understanding of our enduring bilateral ties.

Mr. MANZULLO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for calling this important hearing concerning the critical relationship between the United States and Japan. I want to underscore my deep appreciation for this longstanding friendship and alliance that we share with Japan where I had the opportunity a few years ago to visit Nagoya, went to the Toyota factory there, the Mitsubishi rocket factory, and got to ride the bullet train from Nagoya to Tokyo and I got to sit right up in front. It was almost like a video game. Mr. Chairman, you ought to try that sometime. I wasn't at the controls, I want to let you know that.

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. If the gentleman would yield, I did ride the bullet train, and the fact of the matter is Japan is about 100 years in advance as far as mass transit systems compared to ours. They were able to have trains that could go up to speeds of 125 miles an hour some 50 years ago. And what are we doing? We haven't solved our own mass transit system. Thank you.

Mr. MANZULLO. I am delighted to announce that Ambassador Fujisaki of Japan has graciously agreed to visit Rockford College, which is located in the northwest Illinois congressional district that I have the honor to represent. This will be the second time that Japan's chief envoy to the United States has traveled to Illinois; the first was in 2007, the former Ambassador Kato, we presented him with a Cubs jacket, and he went on to graduate from diplomatic service and is in charge of major league baseball in Japan. He must have got a good background here in the United States, huh, Chairman?

Thus, I want to publicly thank the good folks of Japan for sending such able and distinguished scholars and statesmen, such as Ambassador Fujisaki and Kato to America. Their contributions to the relationship between our two countries cannot be overstated.

Our congressional district has a lot of thanks to give to the good folks in Japan. Union Specialties in Union, Illinois, is the last manufacturing of sewing machines in this country, and who came along to pick up the pieces and keep it going but the Japanese with direct foreign investment, and when two fellows from the United States decided to make Japanese rice crackers in the United States, they soon realized that they had to have direct Tokyo influence, and Mitsubishi factories now own in Rockford, Illinois, TD Foods, which is the only domestic manufacturer of delicious Japanese rice crackers. So the Japanese foreign direct investment is responsible for Nissan Forklift in Maringo, Illinois, thus we have a very, very close working relationship with the Japanese, and we are very much appreciative of their investment in our congressional district, their tireless and effortless willingness to stay involved in manufacturing, and we are very much indebted to the Japanese people and continue to draw closer and closer relationships with our direct investment in Japan and vice-versa.

So we look forward to even stronger ties as we get through these challenges regarding Okinawa. Both sides are very mature at our diplomatic relations. We have a lot of respect for each other, and we will obviously work through it.

So, Mr. Chairman, thank you for calling this meeting and I look forward to the testimony.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Manzullo follows:]

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIA, THE PACIFIC, AND THE GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT
 U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515

Donald A. Manzullo (IL-16), Ranking Member
Opening Statement

March 17, 2010

Mr. Chairman, thank you for calling this important hearing regarding the critical relationship between the United States and Japan. I want to underscore my deep appreciation for this long-standing friendship and alliance that we share with Japan. This important partnership between our two countries is needed now more than ever before.

I am delighted to announce that Ambassador Fujisaki of Japan has graciously agreed to visit Rockford College, which is located in the northwestern Illinois congressional district that I have the honor to represent. This will be the second time that Japan's chief envoy to the U.S. has travelled to Illinois; the first time was in 2007 during the visit of former Ambassador Kato. Thus, I want to publically thank the good people of Japan for sending able and distinguished statesmen such as Ambassadors Fujisaki and Kato to America. Their contributions to the relationship between our two countries cannot be overstated.

The northern Illinois congressional district that I represent has a long and positive relationship with Japan. Foreign direct investments by Japanese companies continue to support countless jobs in the district. For example, Nissan Forklift in Marengo, Illinois currently employs 350 hard-working constituents. We hope that in the near future there may be more positive news concerning Japan's foreign direct investments in Illinois.

Mr. Chairman, I am very concerned about the direction of the U.S.-Japan alliance in the aftermath of the historic election last year that brought Prime Minister Hatoyama's government into power. With regard to the relocation of the Futenma Marine Air Station in Okinawa, I find the Prime Minister's position rather troubling because it calls into question an agreement between two governments solely for political reasons. Both the U.S. and Japan have invested heavily into the transfer of forces, and after 13 years of negotiations I strongly believe the time to talk is now over.

The relationship between the U.S. and Japan remains strong despite the current difficulty regarding Okinawa. As we enter the 50th anniversary of our alliance with Japan, it is important to remember that this partnership is too

important to leave on autopilot. As friends, our two countries have worked through difficult times in the past, and I have no doubt we can get through this mess now.

I look forward to hearing from our distinguished guests.

Mr. FALÉOMAVAEGA. I thank my good friend for his statement. The gentleman from California has an opening statement.

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for calling this important hearing, and I thank our witnesses for attending.

There has been a lot of coverage in the press lately about U.S.-Japanese disputes, but when you look at the depth of the partnership that exists between the United States and Japan, I think it is one that transcends parties. It is certainly one that transcends personalities. We are the two largest economies in the world, and our security alliance has lasted for 50 years. The alliance has been a force for stability in a very tough neighborhood, but there is cause for concern.

Japan's Government is inexperienced. Some Japanese leaders would like to see Tokyo tilt more toward Beijing. The dispute over the relocation of U.S. Marines on Okinawa has been badly handled. I think most Japanese would agree with that statement. There is a threat that this issue could spill into the functional operations of our alliance, but this is not just an issue for U.S.-Japan relations. Our alliance provides the oxygen for many in the region. It is part of the security network throughout East Asia. U.S. allies Singapore, Australia, South Korea, the Philippines, are all concerned. The good news is that the Japanese public maintains its support for United States-Japan alliance at about 75 percent. However, about two-thirds of the Japanese think that the alliance has been poorly handled by the new government.

The U.S. security guarantee in Asia has allowed the region's countries to link themselves together, not with military pacts, but with trade. We provide the stability for free trade to flow, yet we are on the sidelines when it comes to trade in the region. As I noted the other week with Assistant Secretary Campbell, we are party to just two of the 168 trade agreements in force in Asia. That is not nearly good enough.

I would also just on another subject make the point that Japan's population, its density, its geography make it entirely different when discussing public transportation than with respect to the United States. We look at economic merit when addressing infrastructure or at least we should. The Japanese situation with respect to density makes the development of their public transit system there a very rational thing for Japan to have done.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and I yield back.

Mr. FALÉOMAVAEGA. Thank you.

The gentleman from California, Mr. Rohrabacher.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and it is vitally important that we reaffirm to both the people of Japan and the people of the United States that the relationship with Japan is of utmost importance to our future, and to the present—not just the future, but the present. Japan, to some degree, has been taken for granted by the people of the United States. It has been off our radar screen, and that is not good, and without this incredible partnership between Japan and the United States the history of the world would be a lot different. The history of the cold war certainly would have been a lot different, and it would have been more costly to contain communism, it would have been, frankly, the threat to

the Western World would probably still have been upon that we faced 30 or 40 years ago.

But the partnership with Japan enabled us to have a prosperous and a secure region of the world, and a partner that would be with us, maybe not by sending armed might, but be with us in every other way as we went into conflicts throughout the world.

Well, as I say, unfortunately some Americans, because there wasn't a lot of controversy at that time, just took that for granted. Well, unfortunately, I think a lot of people in Japan have taken America for granted the same way the Japanese were taken for granted by Americans, and that is, the people of Japan have to know that they will not have the peace and stability in their region, in their country, and the prosperity in their country without this continued close relationship with the United States. It will not happen—you know, somebody said that—I remember it was Ronald Reagan who said this first, I believe—that people take the air for granted because it is there, and they just think, well, let us just take that for granted. But if you cut off the air for even a millisecond, maybe within 30 seconds of cutting of somebody's air they realize how important that factor is.

And I think that right now as Japanese-American relations are being reexamined and some strains that are very evident, that we must make sure that we do not take the air for granted. We do not take the reality, the wonderful reality we have had for 50 years that just happened, it didn't just happen, it happened because the dynamic was created between the Japanese people and the American people that led to that prosperity and peace and stability, and yes, freedom and democracy.

This is the worse possible moment for our countries to be focusing on our differences rather than our similarities. This is the worst possible moment we have an emerging and ever stronger dictatorship in China that will, if it senses weakness, will become an offensive force in the region that will disrupt the stability and the prosperity that we have enjoyed.

So, Mr. Chairman, we need to make sure that we have these kinds of hearings and reach out to our fellows in Japan because I believe that whether it is Okinawa or some of these other issues that are strained right now and that are questioned and are pulling at our relationship, those things are so minuscule in importance as compared to maintaining the overall alliance that we have had with Japan because, as I say, this is happening at the moment when China can become a huge threat to the status quo in a very negative way.

Let me just make one note. We have territorial claims by China in the South China Sea that would put Japan at risk almost immediately. You cannot have Beijing having territorial control or that cannot be—cannot recognize that they have these rights that go right out into the sea without it having a severe impact on Japanese shipping lanes, and that is their lifeblood, and like our country, those shipping lanes are their lifeblood. So let us get on with the hearing, and again appreciate you bringing the issues up today.

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. I thank the gentleman for his comments, and now I would like to turn the time over to my good friend, the gentlelady from California, Dr. Watson.

Ms. WATSON. Konbanwa. Thank you for holding this timely hearing about growing U.S.-Japan relations. The August 2009 elections led to a landslide victory for the Democratic Party of Japan, and for the first time in nearly 50 years there is a change in the governing party in Japan.

I lived in Okinawa in the early seventies as American teacher at Kadina Air Force Base, and at that time, of course, we were so compatible and we had our bases there where families chose to live after our military would be relocated. Some of them after retiring came back to live there because it was a wonderful environment, and that is how I remember Japan, Okinawa, Japan, now.

And so I would hope that these kinds of hearings will keep us informed as how our relationships are, and I do know we, as Americans, do falter in the behavior of some of our people in various places around the world, but as my colleague just said, these are minuscule compared to the very strong and healthy relationships that we have had in the immediate aftermath of the second World War, and the time that I was in that part of the world.

Now, the DPJ has slowly begun to alter Japanese foreign policy, choosing to better relationships with Japan's neighboring nations, and increasing the efficacy and transparency of their government. Though Japan's involving interactions with China and North Korea should be monitored, greater interaction among Asian nations will hopefully lead to a more stability in the region.

The new DPJ government offers us an opportunity to expand our already strong relationship which we have had and the Asia-Pacific region, and I know some people feel that our intent in many places in the world is to occupy. It is not to occupy. It is to remain partners and collaborators together as we retain the peace and help these nations grow, and I would say that Japan has grown to be a strong and important leader globally, and I would hope that as we continue our relationship there that we continue to strengthen our relationships with Japan and the other Asia-Pacific areas in that region.

So thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I will yield back the remainder of my time.

[The prepared statement of Ms. Watson follows:]

Statement
Congresswoman Diane E. Watson
Subcommittee on Asia the Pacific and Global Environment
Committee on Foreign Affairs
Wednesday, March 17, 2010
2172 Rayburn House Office Building
2:30 p.m.

“U.S.-Japan Relations: Enduring Ties, Recent Developments”

Good afternoon, and thank you Mr. Chairman for holding this timely hearing about growing U.S.-Japan relations. The August 2009 elections led to a landslide victory for the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ). For the first time in nearly 50 years, there is a change in the governing party in Japan.

The DPJ has slowly begun to alter Japanese foreign policy, choosing to better relationships with Japan’s neighboring nations, and increasing the efficiency and transparency of their government. Though Japan’s evolving interactions with China and North Korea should be monitored, greater interaction among Asian nations will hopefully lead to more stability in the region. The new DPJ government offers us an opportunity to expand our already strong relationship with Japan and the Asia Pacific region.

Thank you Mr. Chairman, and I yield back the remainder of my time.

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. I thank the gentlelady for her comments, and I am sure all of us here as members of the subcommittee have had very positive experiences in dealing with this important ally, the country of Japan.

We have with us this afternoon some very key witnesses. I deeply appreciate their taking the time from their busy schedules to come and testify before us. We have our principal deputy assistant secretary from the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs from the State Department, a Senior Foreign Officer, Mr. Joseph Donovan.

Previous to his appointment as principal deputy assistant secretary, he served as counsel general in Hong Kong, and also held important points in our embassy in Tokyo as well as in Taiwan; political counselor as well as chief of military affairs in our embassy in Tokyo; also in Beijing, as well as in Kaohsiung in Taiwan.

Deputy Assistant Secretary Donovan is a graduate of Georgetown University with a degree in foreign service, and also received his master’s degree with distinction in national security affairs at the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey.

Also with us this afternoon is deputy assistant secretary of defense for Asian & Pacific affairs, Mr. Michael Schiffer. Before his appointment as the deputy assistant secretary of defense for East Asian & Pacific affairs, he was also with the Secretary of Defense in 2009 and was involved with the Stanley Foundation—I don’t know what is the matter with my voice this afternoon. Secretary Schiffer also worked as a senior staff member for Diane Feinstein, and was senior advisor to Senator Feinstein on national security and legislative affairs. He was involved also in New York Univer-

sity where he received his—well, his undergraduate studies at Georgetown University and has graduate degrees from the London School of Economics, and also New York University.

We generally have a 5-minute rule, gentlemen, and give us all the good things, if you could share that with us so we could also have an opportunity to raise some questions.

I am sorry, just one more delay. I would like to turn the time over to my friend from New Jersey, Mr. Smith, if he has an opening statement.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. If you don't mind, I will wait until questions, and I thank you for that courtesy.

Mr. FALEOMAVEGA. All right. Secretary Donovan.

STATEMENT OF MR. JOSEPH R. DONOVAN, JR., PRINCIPAL DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY, BUREAU OF EAST ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Mr. DONOVAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Manzullo, and members of the subcommittee. It is a privilege to appear before you today.

As the chairman has just mentioned, in 2010, the United States and Japan are celebrating the 50th anniversary of our treaty of mutual cooperation and security, a historic milestone that is both an opportunity to reflect on the successes of the past half-century, and also an opportunity to look ahead.

Today, Japan is among our most important trading partners and a staunch and important ally. We work together on a broad range of critical issues from the United Nations and the Six-Party Talks to increasing regional economic integration, promoting democracy and human rights, climate change, nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament, and coordinating humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. Japan continues to be an increasingly active partner in global affairs and our bilateral and multilateral cooperation transcends the Asia-Pacific region.

Japan is working with us and others on post-earthquake recovery in Haiti and Chile. It is a vital international supporter of reconstruction, reintegration and development in Afghanistan, and it is combatting piracy off the Horn of Africa.

Like the United States, Japan experienced historic political change in the last year. At the end of August 2009 Japan held an election for the Lower House of the Diet. In that election the Democratic Party of Japan won a dramatic victory, ending 55 years of almost unbroken rule by the Liberal Democratic Party.

United States congratulated Japan on this historic election and joined the people of Japan in reaffirming the strong democratic tradition that we share. We also welcomed the opportunity to work with the new government in Tokyo on a broad range of global, regional, and bilateral issues. Since August, President Obama has met twice with Prime Minister Hatoyama. Secretary Clinton has met several times with her counterpart, Foreign Minister Okada, most recently, in January, in Hawaii.

As President Clinton said in his Tokyo speech last November, United States-Japan alliance is not a historic relic from a bygone era, but it is an abiding commitment to each other that is fundamental to our shared security. For half a century, United States-

Japan alliance has played an indispensable role in ensuring the security and prosperity of both United States and Japan as well as regional peace and stability, and we are committed to ensuring that it continues to be effective in meeting the challenges of the twenty-first century.

Since the end of the cold war the United States and Japan have worked together to update our alliance through efforts ranging from the force posture realignment to the review of roles, missions and capabilities. The alliance has grown in scope with cooperation on everything from missile defense to information security.

Through the Defense Policy Review Initiative, the United States and Japan have made a landmark alliance commitment to implement a coherent package of force posture realignments that will have far-reaching benefits for the alliance. These changes will help strengthen the flexibility and deterrent capability of U.S. forces while creating the conditions for more sustainable U.S. military presence in the region.

The transformation includes the relocation of approximately 8,000 marines from Okinawa to Guam, force posture relocations and land returns on Okinawa and other realignments and combined capability changes on mainland Japan. This realignment will strengthen both countries' ability to meet current responsibilities and create an alliance that is more flexible, capable, and better able to work together to address common security concerns.

The Futenma Replacement Facility, a linchpin of the realignment road map, is currently being reviewed by the new Japanese Government. The Government of Japan has stated that its review of the relocation issue will conclude by May. As Secretary Clinton has said, we are respectful of the Japanese Government's process, at the same time our position remains that in terms of both the security arrangements needed to protect Japan and fulfill our treaty commitments, and to limit the impact of bases on local communities, particularly on Okinawa, that the realignment road map presents the best way forward.

Mr. Chairman, the United States and Japan together generate over a third of global output. We are global leaders and we are finding more and more that our engagement is global in scope as we tackle issues like energy security and climate change, protect intellectual property right, deepen and strengthen the Asia-Pacific economic community, and address critical development needs in Iraq, Afghanistan, Africa, and elsewhere.

As important as our global economic relationship has become, we also need to continue our efforts to expand trade and investment between us. We continue to urge Japan to make meaningful market access commitments in the Doha development round negotiations. We are working hard to further open the Japanese market to U.S. beef, consistent with science and international standards, and to improve market access to U.S. automobiles.

We are also pressing Japan to establish a level playing field between Japan post and private companies in the insurance, banking and express delivery sectors in accordance with Japan's international obligations.

On December 11, 2009, we concluded a U.J.-Japan Open Skies Civil Aviation Agreement. Upon its entry into force, the new agree-

ment will represent a market-oriented approach to civil aviation relations. Airlines, not governments, will decide which cities to serve the frequency of flights, the equipment used, and the prices charged.

Japan today is playing an increasing active role in the world stage, aiding in reconstruction activities in Iraq and anti-piracy operations off the Horn of Africa. Active in Afghanistan's reconstruction since 2002 under its new government, Japan has become the second largest international contributor to Afghanistan. Japan also continues to provide strong leadership and encouraging additional international support for Pakistan. We welcome these efforts.

We also are working to enhance our global cooperation on development efforts as well. Japan has been a strong supporter of the global nonproliferation regime, and last December in Copenhagen Japanese leadership played a vital role in helping the international community take a meaningful step toward addressing the global challenge of climate change.

Japan and the United States have a great opportunity to advance regional prosperity during our back-to-back host years in 2010 and 2011, respectively. Together we are working with our APEC partners to build resilient economies by preparing the region for natural disasters, bolstering public health capabilities, and ensuring an abundant and affordable food supply.

Whatever the challenges we may face in the next half-century I am confident that our relationship with Japan will be an important element of our success. Our relation continues to develop and evolve, and continues to contribute to peace, prosperity and security throughout the region and the globe.

Thank you very much for inviting me to testify and I look forward to your questions.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Donovan follows:]

**Statement of
Joseph Donovan
Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State
Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs**

Submitted to the

**House Foreign Affairs Committee
Subcommittee on Asia, the Pacific, and the Global Environment**

March 17, 2010

U.S.-Japan Relations: Enduring Ties, Recent Developments

Mr. Chairman, Mr. Manzullo, and Members of the Subcommittee, it is a privilege to appear before you today. In 2010, the United States and Japan are celebrating the 50th anniversary of our Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security, a historic milestone that is both an opportunity to reflect on the successes of the past half century and also an opportunity to look ahead toward future challenges and possibilities. In 2010, Japan is also host of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum, which will culminate in an APEC leaders meeting in Yokohama in November.

Japan is among our most important trading partners and a staunch and important ally. We work together on a broad range of important issues: from the United Nations and the Six-Party Talks to increasing regional economic integration, promoting democracy and human rights, climate change, nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, and coordinating humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. Japan continues to be an increasingly active partner in global affairs, and our bilateral and multilateral cooperation transcends the Asia-Pacific region. Japan is working with us and others on post-earthquake recovery in Haiti and Chile, is a vital international supporter of reconstruction, reintegration, and development in Afghanistan, and is combating piracy off the Horn of Africa to ensure freedom of navigation and safety of mariners.

Whatever challenges we may face in the next half century, I am confident that our relationship with Japan will be an important element of our success. Our relationship continues to develop and evolve, and continues to contribute to peace, prosperity and security throughout the region and the globe.

Japanese Domestic Politics

I would like to begin with a brief look at the current domestic political situation in Japan, which will provide context for a broader discussion of U.S.-Japan security alliance issues and political and economic issues.

Like the United States, Japan experienced historic political change last year. At the end of August 2009, Japan held an election for the Lower House of the Diet. In that election, the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) won a dramatic victory, gaining 308 out of 480 seats, and ending 55 years of almost unbroken rule by the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). The LDP-led coalition had already lost its majority in the Upper House in July 2007, although the DPJ did not hold an absolute majority in that chamber. When, on September 16, the DPJ formed its government with Yukio Hatoyama as Prime Minister, the new cabinet was formally a coalition with two minority parties, the Social Democratic Party and the People's New Party. The combined seats of the coalition are sufficient for the government to control both chambers of the Diet, a necessity for the government to smoothly pass crucial legislation, including the budget.

The United States congratulated Japan on this historic election and joined the people of Japan in reaffirming the strong democratic tradition that we share. We also welcomed the opportunity to work with the new government in Tokyo on a broad range of global, regional and bilateral issues. Since August, President Obama has met twice with Prime Minister Hatoyama; Secretary Clinton met most recently with her counterpart, Foreign Minister Okada, in January in Hawaii.

The new Japanese government stated that its highest priorities are domestic. It seeks to reinvigorate the Japanese economy and reform the political system. Furthermore, the DPJ has had to take into account the views of its coalition partners, whose own policy objectives are not entirely the same as that of the DPJ. In December, the Social Democratic Party stated publicly that it would leave the coalition – potentially having an impact on the DPJ's budget and other critical legislation – if the government proceeded to implement the 2006 bilateral Realignment Roadmap and the 2009 Guam International Agreement and relocate the Futenma Marine Corps Air Station to a new facility attached to Camp Schwab. Subsequently, in an effort to reach a compromise, the government tasked a commission – including representatives from each of the three parties in the coalition – with examining all options for a Futenma Replacement Facility (FRF).

U.S.-Japan Security Alliance

As President Obama said in his Tokyo speech last November, the U.S.-Japan alliance is not a historic relic from a bygone era, but an abiding commitment to each other that is fundamental to our shared security.

The U.S.-Japan Alliance plays an indispensable role in ensuring the security and prosperity of both the United States and Japan, as well as regional peace and stability. The Alliance is rooted in our shared values, democratic ideals, respect for human rights,

rule of law and common interests. The Alliance has served as the foundation of our security and prosperity for the past half century, and we are committed to ensuring that it continues to be effective in meeting the challenges of the 21st century. The U.S.-Japan security arrangements underpin cooperation on a wide range of global and regional issues as well as foster stability and prosperity in the Asia-Pacific region.

The Alliance is the cornerstone of our engagement in East Asia. That is a phrase oft-repeated by U.S. officials, but I think it is important and perhaps timely to step back and consider what that means. This cornerstone role began and grew out of the farsighted vision of American leaders at the end of World War II, a vision that recognized the importance of building strong partnerships with democratic market economies to meet the challenges of the second half of the 20th century, not just with our wartime allies, but equally with those who had been our adversaries. This vision was predicated on an idea, validated by the passage of time, that U.S. interests are best served by the emergence of strong, prosperous and independent democracies across the Pacific, as well as the Atlantic. Those leaders built an alliance with Japan based both on common interests and shared values, an alliance formally consecrated 50 years ago. That alliance not only helped secure peace and prosperity for the people of Japan and the United States, but it also helped create the conditions that have led to the remarkable emergence of Asia as the cockpit of the global economy that has helped lift millions out of poverty and gradually spread the blessings of democratic governance to more and more countries of that region.

The Alliance had its roots in the Cold War. With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the movement towards a more market-oriented government in China, some began to question the relevance of what President Eisenhower had called our indestructible partnership. Yet under the leadership of President Clinton and Prime Minister Hashimoto, the United States and Japan set out to demonstrate that our partnership should and could adapt to the evolving dynamics of the post-Cold War Asia.

In the 14 years since the Clinton-Hashimoto Joint Security declaration, the relationship has grown stronger even as it has evolved. The United States and Japan have worked together to update our alliance, through efforts ranging from the force posture realignment to the review of roles, missions, and capabilities. The alliance has grown in scope, with cooperation on everything from missile defense to information security. Additionally, Japan provides approximately \$3 billion annually in host nation support to the U.S. military, more than any other U.S. ally.

There are more than 48,000 American military personnel deployed in Japan, including our only forward deployed carrier strike group, the 5th Air Force, and the III Marine Expeditionary Force. Through the Defense Policy Review Initiative (DPRI), the United States and Japan made a landmark alliance commitment under the 2006 U.S.-Japan Realignment Roadmap, which was reaffirmed by the 2009 Guam International Agreement, to implement a coherent package of force posture realignments that will have far-reaching benefits for the Alliance. These changes will help strengthen the flexibility and deterrent capability of U.S. forces while creating the conditions for a more sustainable U.S. military presence in the region. The transformation includes the

relocation of approximately 8,000 Marines from Okinawa to Guam, force posture relocations and land returns on Okinawa, and other realignments and combined capability changes on mainland Japan (e.g., increased interoperability, as well as collaboration on ballistic missile defense). This realignment will strengthen both countries' ability to meet current responsibilities and create an Alliance that is more flexible, capable, and better able to work together to address common security concerns, whether in the region or globally.

The Futenma Replacement Facility, a lynchpin of the Realignment Roadmap, is currently being reviewed by the new DPJ government. The Government of Japan has stated that its review of the relocation issue will conclude by May. As Secretary Clinton has said, "we are respectful of the Japanese government's process." At the same time, "our position remains that in terms of both the security arrangements needed to protect Japan and to limit the impact of bases on local communities, particularly on Okinawa, that the realignment roadmap presents the best way forward.

The U.S.-Japan Economic Relationship

Mr. Chairman, the United States and Japan are the world's largest economies, together generating over a third of global output. We owe much of our prosperity to our bilateral economic relationship. In 2009, Japan and the United States exchanged the equivalent of \$400 million in goods every day. Japanese companies in the United States employed 665,200 American workers in 2007; and U.S. firms provided jobs for over 302,900 Japanese workers. According to the most recent figures (from 2008), the United States has almost \$79 billion invested in Japan – more than a third of Japan's total inward investment, while Japan's direct investment stock in the United States is also substantial, at \$259.6 billion, over 30 percent of all Japanese outward investment. We enjoyed a \$16.8 billion surplus in our services trade with Japan in 2008, which partly compensated for our \$74.1 billion deficit in goods trade. Last year, we exported \$51.2 billion in goods to Japan, and our goods trade deficit with Japan fell to \$44.8 billion. Our economic relationship is more cooperative and less confrontational than in the past, although some long-standing trade irritants remain. We recognize that to sustain productive, growing domestic economies and maintain a strong international system based on free markets, opportunity, and effective and responsible economic governance, we need to continue to work together. We are global leaders, and we are finding more and more that our engagement is global in scope as we tackle issues like energy security and climate change; protect intellectual property rights; deepen and strengthen the Asia-Pacific economic community; and address critical development needs in Iraq, Afghanistan, Africa and elsewhere.

As important as our global economic relationship has become, we also need to continue our efforts to expand trade and investment between us. Our trade with Japan is not growing at the same rate as our trade with other countries in the region, and we continue to urge Japan to make meaningful market access commitments in the Doha Development Round negotiations. We are working hard to further open the Japanese market to U.S. beef, consistent with science and international standards and to improve market access

for U.S. automobiles. We are also pressing Japan to establish a level playing field between Japan Post and private companies in the insurance, banking, and express delivery sectors, in accordance with Japan's international obligations. In its policies and public statements, Japan should create and maintain a climate that welcomes foreign investment.

On December 11, 2009, we concluded a new U.S.-Japan Open Skies civil aviation agreement. Upon its entry into force, the new agreement will represent a market-oriented approach to civil aviation relations: airlines, not governments, will decide which cities to serve, the frequency of flights, the equipment used, and the prices charged. The Open Skies agreement with Japan meets all elements of the U.S. Department of Transportation's 1992 definition and mirrors agreements we have with more than 90 partners around the world. Regarding Narita, Tokyo's international airport, U.S. airlines are guaranteed slots to allow for future growth. At Haneda, Tokyo's domestic airport which will open to scheduled international service next October, we negotiated conditions that will ensure competitive equality for U.S. and Japanese carriers.

Global Partnership Issues

Japan today is playing an increasingly active role on the world stage, aiding in reconstruction efforts in Iraq and anti-piracy operations off the Horn of Africa. A participant in the Contact Group on Piracy Off the Coast of Somalia (CGPCS), Japan chaired its fourth session and has also contributed \$14 million to the International Maritime Organization's Task Force to implement the Djibouti Code of Conduct. Active in Afghanistan's reconstruction since 2002, under its new government Japan has become the second largest international contributor to Afghanistan. Japan also continues to provide strong leadership in encouraging additional international support for Pakistan. We especially welcome and value Japan's continued leadership on Afghanistan reconstruction and reintegration efforts. In Afghanistan, its new \$5 billion/five year commitment quadruples its annual assistance levels and will help train police officers, reintegrate demobilized fighters, expand agriculture, and build critical infrastructure as we work towards our shared goals of a stable and peaceful Afghanistan, and hope and progress in Pakistan. Although the Japanese Indian Ocean refueling support ended in January, we share the hope on the part of the international community that there will be other Japanese Self-Defense Force contributions to stability in this crucial region. We have been impressed by the public comments and actions of the Japanese government underscoring the importance of Afghanistan's development, and we look forward to working with Japan as it considers additional projects focused on promoting peace and stability in the region. Our cooperation on development has been global in scope, including a long-standing USAID global health partnership with Japan that has led to joint projects and closely coordinated efforts in more than 30 developing countries around the world, in such vital areas as HIV/AIDS prevention and maternal and child health care. We hope to be able to deepen this kind of assistance collaboration with Japan, in health as well as on other global development issues of mutual interest.

Japan has also been a strong supporter of the global nonproliferation regime, reflected recently in the installation of Yukio Amano, a respected Japanese public servant as the new director of the IAEA. And last December in Copenhagen, Japanese leadership played a vital role in helping the international community take a meaningful step towards addressing the global challenge of climate change.

Haitian and Chilean Relief

Japan's response to the devastating earthquakes in Haiti and Chile was swift, reflecting Japan's expertise in natural disaster response. Throughout the aftermath of these devastating earthquakes, our governments have been in close contact with one another, with the Governments of Haiti and Chile, and with the United Nations organizations, to ensure swift, efficient delivery of emergency relief to the people of Haiti and Chile. I would highlight in particular the close cooperation between Japan's Self Defense Forces and SOUTHCOM, as well as between Japan's Foreign Ministry and the Department of State, in the immediate aftermath of the Haitian earthquake, made possible by our strong alliance ties.

Within 48 hours of Haiti's earthquake, Japan pledged to provide emergency supplies as well as substantial financial support for the World Food Program and UNICEF. By January 17, Japan had set up a field hospital in Léogâne, just west of Port-au-Prince, manned first by a small civilian team, then augmented by a 100-person Self Defense Forces medical unit. A Japanese Air Self Defense Forces C-130 evacuated 34 American citizens on its January 17 return trip – a generous act those Americans will always remember. Japan also deployed 350 Self Defense Forces personnel, including 190 engineers, to the MINUSTAH peacekeeping mission in Haiti, under whose auspices they are clearing rubble and restoring roads. To date, Japan has announced pledges of over \$70 million to Haiti: \$25 million for emergency response and \$45 million for long-term reconstruction.

Japan's response to the Chilean quake was equally rapid. Quickly consulting with the Chilean government, Japan offered to dispatch an emergency medical mission, provided US \$3 million for emergency relief assistance grants, and approximately US \$300,000 worth of supplies. Should the Chilean people have additional needs, their government knows it can count on Japan to support international efforts to help them rebuild.

Japan's APEC Priorities

Japan and the United States have a great opportunity to advance regional prosperity during our back-to-back APEC host years in 2010 and 2011, respectively. We are working closely with Japan to address trade and investment barriers, strengthen regional economic integration, and undertake pragmatic actions that will stimulate more balanced, sustainable, knowledge-based and inclusive growth. Together we are also working with our APEC partners to build resilient economies by preparing the region for natural disasters, bolstering public health capabilities, and ensuring an abundant and affordable food supply. In addition, the United States and Japan are also coordinating APEC's

efforts to promote greener economies in the region, including by promoting trade and investment in environmental goods and services and increasing energy efficiency in the region. Finally, we are working to encourage entrepreneurship, especially women's entrepreneurship, to ensure long-term prosperity that benefits all.

Thank you very much for inviting me to testify. I look forward to your questions.

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Thank you, Secretary Donovan. Secretary Schiffer.

STATEMENT OF MR. MICHAEL SCHIFFER, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR ASIAN & PACIFIC, SECURITY AFFAIRS (EAST ASIA), U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Mr. SCHIFFER. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Manzullo, members of the subcommittee, thank you for the privilege of appearing before you today to discuss United States-Japan security relationship.

The relationship between the United States and Japan has provided the foundation for peace, security, stability, and economic prosperity in the Asia-Pacific region for more than 60 years. It is a relationship that has adapted and continues to evolve to address changes in the security environment, in our political systems, and in our respective capacities and capabilities.

As has already been noted here this afternoon, the alliance has been in the news recently in connection with the Government of Japan's decision to reevaluate the plans for the relocation of Marine Corps Air Station Futenma, the termination of Japan's Indian Ocean fueling operations and the so-called secret agreements, among other issues. These new stories have led to understandable concerns in certain quarters about the state of the relationship, but I think it is important to put these concerns in perspective in light of the much more difficult trials our alliance has endured in the past, emerging stronger each time; in light of the rich agenda of cooperation currently underway; and in light of the even more active agenda for deeper and broader cooperation that lies ahead.

When we consider our partnership on such issues as missile defense, information security, extended deterrence, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, to give just a few examples, the foundation for an evermore robust alliance is clearly evident. For example, U.S. missile defense cooperation with Japan has become a central element in the defense relationship. Japan's investment in four BMD-capable Aegis destroyers and the upgrade of its Patriot battalions to pack-3 capability represents a significant augmentation and strengthening of the missile defense capability that protects Japan and our forces stationed there.

As part of the 50th anniversary agenda, this year we have begun a formal dialogue with the Japanese to address information and cyber security, space and ballistic missile defense, all of which are central strategic issues for the twenty-first century. We believe that

it is critical to be able to hold confidential discussions with the Japanese Government on a range of sensitive strategic issues and we look forward to doing so.

One additional area where we have seen an especially rich agenda for partnership is humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, peacekeeping operations and maritime security. Just this past month we agreed to start up a working group with Japan that will give particular focus to seeking bilateral agreement to enhance U.S.-Japanese cooperation and embody new operational initiatives in this area.

In the here and now, however, public focus has been on the implementation of the 2006 bilateral realignment road map, specifically the relocation of the Futenma station. The Futenma Replacement Facility at Camp Swab is one component of a larger plan to consolidate the U.S. presence on Okinawa onto existing bases, and move away from the densely populated portion of the island. The Futenma realignment package will allow us to reposition more than 8,000 marines from Japan to Guam and return nearly 70 percent of land south of Kadina Air Base to the Okinawan people, all while addressing noise, safety, environmental concerns, and creating a lighter footprint and a much more sustainable presence for U.S. forces on Okinawa.

For reasons you highlighted in your opening statement, Mr. Chairman, we believe these are important goals.

Beyond the realignment road map and base-specific questions, however, I also think it is important to keep in mind the larger strategic issues in play. Futenma may be but one base in one part of a larger alliance relationship, but peace and stability in the region depend in no small part of the enduring presence of forward-deployed U.S. forces in Japan. The only readily deplorable U.S. ground forces between Hawaii and India are the U.S. Marines on Okinawa. The United States cannot meet its treaty obligation to defend Japan, cannot respond to humanitarian crisis or natural disaster, cannot meet its commitments for regional peace and stability without forward-deployed ground forces in Japan with the appropriate capabilities and training.

In this broader context, the goal of the road map is to provide the alliance, not just the United States, not just Japan, but the alliance, Japan and the United States together, with the posture and the capabilities necessary to be able to meet our commitments in the defense of Japan, to respond to challenges in the region and around the globe, and to continue to underwrite peace, stability, and economic prosperity in the region for decades to come.

The second issue I would like to briefly highlight today is the negotiations that we will soon undertake with Japan on host nation support.

In addition to providing bases, Japan's host nation support, or HNS, is a strategic pillar of the alliance. We view HNS as a mutual investment in our commitment to regional stability. Japan provides financial and logistical support. The United States provides resources and manpower capabilities. Through HNS each side complements the other and together we create a robust alliance capacity. We look forward to working with Japan and with this committee and Congress as these negotiations get underway.

Let me now turn my attention briefly to our broader security partnership with Japan on the global stage. Despite its constitutional limitations, Japan is playing an ever greater role and shouldering ever greater responsibility in addressing regional and global security challenges. Japan's maritime self-defense forces remain active in counter-piracy operations off the Horn of Africa, an operation that has contributed to regional security and the freedom of global commerce.

Japan is also sending its defense force into more areas than ever before for humanitarian assistance and disaster relief missions, most recently a deployment of 350 ground self-defense force personnel to Haiti to assist in reconstruction efforts there, and has been noted, Japan is also the second largest contributor of reconstruction and stabilization efforts in Afghanistan and in Pakistan, having pledged some \$6 billion to these efforts.

We remain grateful to Japan for its leadership in these efforts in the region and globally, and look forward to continued partnership with our Japanese ally in addressing these and other global challenges.

Closer to home, the Democratic Party of Japan since they have come into power have sought to strengthen Japan's ties with other countries in the region. We welcome these initiatives. In particular, United States, Japan and the Republic of Korea share values, interests, and a common view on the dangers posed by North Korea's missile and nuclear weapons development programs, and we have worked together to deepen these ties through the Defense Tri-lateral Talks.

A strong U.S.-Japan alliance is also critical to the success of the multilateral security cooperation in the region, and we are committed to working with Japan to assure that Asia's evolving multilateral organizations are inclusive, transparent, and solution-oriented.

As equal partners, Japan and the United States share a commitment to regional and global peace, security and stability. As President Obama said in Tokyo last year, the 50th anniversary of United States-Japan alliance represents an important opportunity to step back and reflect on what we have achieved, celebrate our friendship, but also find ways to renew this alliance to refresh it for the twenty-first century.

We look forward to the next 50 years of an alliance that will continue to be indispensable to the peace and prosperity of the United States, of Japan, and of the entire Asia-Pacific region, and we look forward to working with you, Mr. Chairman, and the committee as we chart a way forward. Thank you and I look forward to your questions.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Schiffer follows:]

**Statement of
Michael Schiffer
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for East Asia
Submitted to the**

**House Foreign Affairs Committee
Subcommittee on Asia, the Pacific, and the Global Environment**

March 17, 2010

U.S.-Japan Relations: Enduring Ties, Recent Developments

Introduction

Mr. Chairman, Mr. Manzullo, and Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for the privilege of appearing before you today to discuss the U.S.-Japan security relationship as we commence our second half-century under the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security. The relationship between the United States and Japan has provided the foundation for peace, security, stability, and economic prosperity in the Asia-Pacific region since the end of the Second World War, and it has become a fixture in the strategic landscape, not only for the United States and Japan, but as a public good for countries throughout the region and indeed, around the world. It is a unique relationship, built on common interests and shared values that bind together two very different countries – a relationship that has adapted and continues to evolve to address changes in the security environment, in our political systems, and in our respective capacities and capabilities.

State of the U.S.-Japan Security Relationship

I don't think it is a secret to anyone that the alliance has been in the news of late in connection with a variety of issues: the Government of Japan's decision to re-evaluate the plans for relocation of Marine Corps Air Station Futenma within Okinawa prefecture, the termination of Japan's Indian Ocean refueling operations, and the so-called "secret agreements," among other topics. These news stories have led to understandable concern, in some quarters, about the state of the relationship.

But we need to put those concerns in perspective, in light of the much more difficult trials our alliance has endured in the past, the rich agenda of cooperation underway, and the even more active agenda for deeper and broader cooperation that lies ahead. While the Democratic Party of Japan's assumption of power following the historic elections last fall is significant, the change in government in Japan and the policy reexaminations that have accompanied that change, bear no comparison to far deeper challenges the Alliance faced in 1960, 1970, and 1972. My remarks will focus on the security aspects our relationship – and security issues remain a priority – but I also want to re-emphasize the longevity and

breadth of our total relationship with Japan and reiterate that we should not lose sight of the fact that the U.S.-Japan relationship encompasses a broad spectrum of bilateral cooperative activities beyond security.

By placing the alliance's progress in proper perspective –rather than simply reacting to today's newspaper headlines – we can see how far we have come in overcoming obstacles and building a foundation of strength. The alliance now enjoys some of its highest ever public support rates in both countries and symbolizes a relationship that others in the region view as a foundation of the regional security architecture.

Similarly, when we consider our cooperation on modern problems of non-proliferation, missile defense, reconstruction in Afghanistan and stability in Pakistan, countering piracy, and preserving open sea lines of communication, we see the foundation for an ever-more robust alliance and partnership. Of course, to make this vision a reality, much more will be required of Japan and our alliance in the coming months and years. I am confident that Japan will continue to step up and find ways to do more. It will do so not because the United States asks it to, but rather because Japan has interests at stake, responsibilities to bear, and the capacity to make a difference.

Indeed, today's alliance agenda goes well beyond the formal commitments the United States and Japan have made to each other under the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security, including the U.S. commitment to defend Japan, in return for Japan's commitment to provide facilities and areas for U.S. forces to use in defending Japan and in maintaining peace and security in the Far East.

For example, U.S. missile defense cooperation with Japan has become a central element in the defense relationship. Japan's investments in four BMD-capable AEGIS destroyers, and the upgrades of its Patriot battalions to the PAC-3 capability, are going a long way towards augmenting and strengthening the missile defense capability that protects Japan and our forces stationed there. At the same time, the collaboration between the United States and Japan on the Standard Missile 3 Block IIA not only promises both of our countries the opportunity to improve our future capabilities, but will serve as the foundation for land-based missile defense capabilities that the United States aims to deploy in Europe in support of defense requirements for our NATO allies and partners in the Arabian Gulf region.

An additional area where we see the potential for an especially rich agenda of cooperation is humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, or HA/DR. At our most recent mini-security subcommittee meeting last month, both sides gave particular focus to securing bilateral agreements that would enhance U.S.-Japan HA/DR cooperation and embody new operational initiatives. We view our continued success in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief cooperation as a signature item we have achieved as part of our agenda for the 50th anniversary of the alliance.

Furthermore, Japan continues to be a leader in the international nonproliferation community. Prime Minister Hatoyama and Foreign Minister Okada have been forthright in their support of President Obama's stated goal of a world without nuclear weapons. At the same time, Japan relies on the nuclear umbrella provided by the United States for its security. On December 24 2009, Foreign Minister Okada sent a letter to Secretary Gates and Secretary Clinton requesting a bilateral dialogue on U.S. nuclear weapons, extended deterrence, and non-proliferation policy. As part of our 50th Anniversary agenda this year, we have begun such a formal dialogue with the Japanese to address information and cyber security, space, and ballistic missile defense - all of which are important issues that contribute to extended deterrence.

As we move forward in the alliance, it is important that we continue to hold confidential discussions with the Japanese Government on this range of issues. One important aspect of extended deterrence includes maintaining a "credible" security presence in Japan and the region. With regard to a non-nuclear country like Japan, respecting this policy while still providing for credible extended deterrence for Japan and the region means the ability to maintain our "neither confirm nor deny" policy. Supporting a nuclear-free world and maintaining a nuclear presence are not mutually exclusive ideas. As President Obama stated in Prague last April, although he is committed to seeking the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons, he also recognizes that our current reality requires maintaining credible extended deterrence even as we work towards a world without nuclear weapons.

Our efforts on missile defense, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, and extended deterrence are just a few of the efforts under our 50th Anniversary agenda intended to both celebrate the achievement of the alliance over the past 50 years, as well as position us for the challenges and opportunities of the next 50 years, including on such areas as information and cyber security and space.

Realignment Implementation

In the here and now, however, public focus has been on implementation of the 2006 bilateral Realignment Roadmap, specifically the relocation of Futenma Air Station. Given the amount of attention this has been receiving, it is important to keep in mind that Futenma relocation is a single key element of a larger set of interrelated initiatives that compose the Realignment Roadmap. This Roadmap was not developed in a vacuum, but was based on an agreed set of "common strategic objectives" that reflect the complexities of 21st century, including long-standing, shared regional security challenges such as unresolved border disputes, a growing missile threat from North Korea, the threat of climate-related disasters, and uncertainty over the intent of China's rapid military modernization.

The goal of the Roadmap is to provide the alliance with the posture and the capabilities necessary to be able to meet our commitment to the defense of Japan, respond to challenges in the region, and around the globe. It will also allow us to continue to underwrite peace, stability and economic prosperity in the region for decades to come.

Through the presence, capabilities, and readiness across our military forces, we make clear that the United States will protect U.S. and alliance interests in this unpredictable region. The technologies and combat power at the disposal of our forward-deployed forces are both sophisticated and devastating to adversaries. The United States cannot meet its treaty obligation to defend Japan without forward-deployed forces equipped with the appropriate capabilities and training, nor can we meet our other commitments to regional peace and stability.

The only readily deployable U.S. ground forces between Hawaii and India are the U.S. Marines located on Okinawa. And the Marines serve a much broader purpose in the region beyond merely deterring conflict and fighting in contingencies. III MEF forces led U.S. humanitarian assistance efforts in Indonesia, Bangladesh, and Burma – often in close coordination with their counterparts in Japan’s Self-Defense Forces. Given that hours matter following a natural disaster, the presence of the U.S. Marines in Okinawa is critical for ensuring a timely response with capabilities no one else can bring to bear.

We recognize that the U.S. presence, although critical to providing for Japan’s security and the security of the region, has real effects on local base-hosting communities. In 1972, the United States and Japan worked together to return Okinawa to Japanese control. Since that time, we have been in continuous cooperation to optimize our security capabilities while reducing any detrimental effect on the people of Okinawa resulting from the U.S. force presence, as we do with our own domestic base-hosting communities. Through the Realignment Roadmap, we believe we’ve achieved the best possible option, and the lightest possible footprint given our mutual objectives.

In this context, the Futenma Replacement Facility (FRF) at Camp Schwab is one component of a larger plan to consolidate the U.S. presence on Okinawa onto existing bases, and move away from the densely populated southern portion of the island.

The full realignment package will allow us to reposition more than 8,000 Marines from Japan to Guam and return nearly 70 percent of land south of Kadena Air Base, benefiting the Okinawan people, addressing noise, safety, and environmental concerns, and creating a much more sustainable presence for U.S. forces on Okinawa, all without adversely impacting the Alliance’s operational needs and capabilities. The FRF has gone through several iterations since the initial agreement in 1996, with changes to the plans made in response to issues raised by local communities, the Okinawa government, and the Government of Japan. We recognize that implementing this agreement has been a challenge, over the course of three U.S. administrations and multiple Japanese cabinets

formed by both the current and former ruling parties. Although we believe we've identified the best possible option for Futenma relocation, we understand this is a difficult issue to resolve in a manner that takes into consideration all the complex interests at play. Prime Minister Hatoyama has stated that he intends to resolve the issue by May, and we look forward at that time to resume work with the Government of Japan to fulfill our long-standing mutual objective of realigning our force posture in Okinawa to be more sustainable politically and operationally.

The 2006 Realignment Roadmap also specifically calls for providing joint training opportunities for U.S. and Japanese forces on the islands of Okinawa and Guam. Such joint training arrangements provide the basis for the continuous presence of Japanese forces on U.S. soil – a major step forward for the alliance. Additionally, we are moving toward greater operational cooperation through the co-location of U.S. and Japanese forces. Under the existing bilateral agreements, we are co-locating our air and missile defense commands at Yokota Air Base, and the Ground Self-Defense Force's Central Readiness Force with a transformed U.S. Army command and control structure. These opportunities for greater training and co-location of our forces play a vital role in enhancing the strength of our alliance. Forces who have established ingrained patterns of cooperation, deep friendships, and a better understanding of each other's plans and decision-making processes will be better equipped to respond with speed and efficiency in a crisis situation. Using increased bilateral training as a jumping off point, we will then also have an opportunity to broaden cooperation through trilateral and multilateral training exercises among the United States, Japan, and other partner nations.

However, even as we look ahead to a robust infrastructure on Guam for the Marines and for bilateral training, we must be realistic about the impact of this historic buildup on Guam's infrastructure, environment, and quality of life. We must proceed in a way that balances the continued priority to move forward expeditiously and the need to address environmental and infrastructure challenges created by the ambitious construction timeline.

Host Nation Support

In addition to providing bases, Japan's host nation support, or HNS, is a key strategic pillar of the Alliance. HNS is an important measure to share the cost the United States incurs in Japan to maintain some of the most advanced, and most expensive, military capabilities in the world. It is essential that Japan contribute to the alliance through HNS (as well as through its own forces and in other ways). Japan provides roughly \$3 billion per year in direct support, almost all of which is returned to Japan's economy in the form of rents, salaries, or services – a bargain considering the security Japan gets in return. (To put Japan's overall defense spending into perspective, Japan spends 0.89 percent of its GDP on defense. South Korea spends 2.7 percent, Australia 2.4 percent, Singapore 4.9 percent, and China officially spent 1.4 percent in 2008, although estimates based on

actual outlays are significantly higher. The United States spends more than 4 percent of its GDP on defense.) All this talk of figures might suggest that HNS is simply a type of security commodity that Japan pays for on behalf of the U.S. This is not the case. HNS is a mutual investment in our commitment to regional stability. Japan provides financial and logistical support. The U.S. provides resource and manpower capabilities. Each side compliments each other and creates a robust alliance capacity under HNS.

Although HNS is a strategic pillar of the alliance and an important contribution in terms of the overall cost of maintaining the security relationship, we understand that some in Japan question how the money is being spent. That is why, in 2008, we agreed to conduct a comprehensive review of host nation support to ensure that the Japanese taxpayers benefit from the most efficient program possible, just as we have every incentive to maximize the return on Japan's funding and our own taxpayer resources to support our forces and their families, and ensure quality of life while stationed in Japan.

Status of Forces Agreement

Some in the Government of Japan have suggested a review and revision of the U.S.-Japan Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA). Even though we always stand prepared to discuss with our ally any issues that their government chooses to raise with ours, I think it is important to understand that some of the arguments made to support such a review are grounded in misperceptions of how the SOFA is implemented. Although the SOFA is fifty years old, it is in reality a living document, with its implementation being continuously improved through consultation in bilateral mechanisms such as the Joint Committee. Calls for SOFA revision within Japan also sometimes reflect concerns about environmental issues associated with U.S. facilities. Our bases strive to partner with local communities as good environmental stewards and comply with the more protective of U.S. or Japanese national standards, consistent with our worldwide practice. We're always looking to improve our environmental practices and energy efficiency, and look forward to continuing to partner with the Government of Japan as we do so. So, the reality is that we are constantly working to review the SOFA to assure it is implemented in an appropriate fashion.

International Contributions

On January 15, Japan terminated its Indian Ocean refueling support to Operation ENDURING FREEDOM. Japan's refueling, provided continuously since 2001 (with one interruption in 2008), supported counter-terrorism activities and enabled the participation of key partners, such as Pakistan, in those efforts as well. The decision to terminate refueling support was Japan's decision alone to make, and in the end, Japan determined that it could best support our shared regional security objectives through other means – most notably, with its \$5 billion pledge towards civil-sector efforts in Afghanistan. That money will go towards building civilian capacity, reintegration of militants, demilitarization, and economic development – all critical components of this

administration's Afghanistan strategy. Japan continues to assess what additional and appropriate contribution it may be able to make to missions in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Japan's Maritime Self-Defense Force remains active in counter-piracy operations off the Horn of Africa, an operation that has contributed to regional security and the freedom of global commerce. We hope to continue to build our agenda of cooperation with Japan in maritime security in the region and globally.

Japan is also sending its Self-Defense Force into more areas than ever before for humanitarian assistance and disaster relief missions – most recently, a deployment of 350 Ground Self-Defense Force personnel to Haiti to assist in reconstruction efforts. Generally, these contributions remain limited in size and scope. As a result of those limitations, Japan has long-emphasized the non-military side of international security contributions. Recently, we agreed to formally establish a bilateral working group to focus on issues in humanitarian aid, disaster relief, peace-keeping operations, and anti-piracy operations to identify even more opportunities to partner to advance these goals.

Over time, Japan may decide to relax some of the restrictions that currently prevent its forces from participating in some types of missions or from taking on some types of missions. Japan may even decide to relax its restrictions on collective self-defense and on defense export policies. Or Japan may decide the time has not yet come for those changes. Those are decisions for Japan to make. But regardless of the decisions Japan makes, I am confident that we will see Japan continue to find constitutionally acceptable ways to bear greater responsibility in addressing regional and global security challenges. At the same time, the United States and Japan will also continue to nurture the traditional and formal elements of our Treaty relationship, which remain as relevant today as they were 50 years ago, if not more so.

Regional Relations

Since they have come into power, the Democratic Party of Japan has taken great strides to strengthen Japan's ties with countries in the region. The U.S. welcomes these relationship-building efforts. Perhaps the most significant and positive recent development in regional relations has been the strengthening of trilateral ties among the United States, Japan, and South Korea. The three nations share values, interests, and a common view of the dangers posed by North Korea's missile and nuclear developments. We have deepened these ties through the Defense Trilateral Talks. Just as the two Northeast Asian alliances are commemorating important anniversaries that symbolize the abiding U.S. commitment—the 50th anniversary of the U.S.-Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security and the 60th anniversary of the start of the Korean War—we are also charting a course to broaden and deepen trilateral defense ties.

Trilateral cooperation among the three nations has been vital in conveying a unified front and a common commitment to move towards complete and verifiable denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. U.S. commitment to our allies and their security, together with their strengthening cooperation with each other, is critical to a coordinated, comprehensive approach to North Korea and increased stability and security for the region. This approach also provides a sound basis for broader, multilateral coordination and cooperation with China, Russia, and other countries.

Beyond the region, the contributions that Japan and South Korea are making to international security—from counter-piracy to stabilization and reconstruction in Afghanistan—also build partnership capacity. These efforts are making a positive contribution in current conflicts at the same time that they build capabilities and readiness to deter and, if need be, defend against future security challenges closer to home.

Security ties between Japan and Australia continue to grow as well. Our respective defense and foreign affairs agencies participate in a regular trilateral dialogue designed to improve trilateral operational cooperation to allow for closer partnerships in areas like maritime security, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, and peacekeeping.

We do not see a strong U.S.-Japan alliance as incompatible with Japan's efforts to strengthen its bilateral relationships with its neighbors, including China. Defense Minister Kitazawa stresses that the United States and Japan will work to advance cooperative relations with China, welcoming it to play a constructive and responsible role in the international arena. At the same time, Japan shares our concerns about our limited insight on China's large and rapid military build-up.

A strong U.S.-Japan alliance is also crucial to the success of multilateral cooperation in the region, and we are committed to working with Japan to ensure that Asia's evolving multilateral organizations are inclusive, transparent, and solution-oriented. During a joint statement with President Obama on January 19, Prime Minister Hatoyama declared Japan's commitment to the alliance, remarking that the alliance is the cornerstone on which his concept of an East Asian community would rely. The United States and Japan can together make sure that these institutions have the capacity to bolster shared peace, stability, and prosperity throughout the region. As Secretary Clinton stated during a recent visit to Hawaii, "Our commitment to our bilateral relationships is entirely consistent with – and will enhance – Asia's multilateral groupings."

Conclusion

The Democratic Party of Japan government has made clear its commitment to the U.S.-Japan alliance, as well as to principles of transparency and accountability in a vibrant democracy. There will certainly be differing ideas on how best to move forward together; that is only natural in discussions between two democracies. By working

patiently and persistently through areas of disagreement, we will ensure the continued expansion and strengthening of our relationship, even as the core commitments remain unshaken. As equal partners, we share a commitment to regional security, humanitarian aid and disaster relief, and global peace-keeping operations. As President Obama said in Tokyo last year, the 50th anniversary of the U.S.-Japan alliance “represents an important opportunity to step back and reflect on what we’ve achieved, celebrate our friendship, but also find ways to renew this alliance to refresh it for the 21st century.” I look forward to the next 50 years of an alliance that will continue to be indispensable to the peace and prosperity of the United States, of Japan, and of the entire Asia-Pacific region.

Thank you, and I look forward to your questions.

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Thank you, Secretary Schiffer.

The gentlelady from California for her questions.

Ms. WATSON. First, Mr. Donovan, in your testimony you mentioned the need to expand trade and invest between the United States and Japan, and you also mentioned that the Department of State is urging Japan to make meaningful market access commitments in the Doha development round negotiations, and to further open the Japanese market to American beef.

Can you expand on Japan's position in the Doha development round negotiations, and what are the Japanese main concerns? Now, I know what happened up in South Korea around beef, but can you explain what happened in Japan, please?

Mr. DONOVAN. Dr. Watson, I believe the Japanese concerns revolve around the treatment of services and also agricultural products.

With regard to the beef issue, this has been an issue that I was involve very heavily on for my 3 years, my most recent 3 years in Tokyo, and we continue to urge Japan to adopt a scientifically-based approach to the issue and one based on international standards, and we are confident that if Japan was to do that its market would be reopened to what I regard as not only safe and delicious but inexpensive American beef of all qualities, and we are going to continue to do that. As part of that effort we have worked very closely with the Meat Export Federation as well to expand Japan's market.

Ms. WATSON. I remember back in, I guess, mid-late nineties they were concerned about our fruits, particularly strawberries and so on, and they found that by the time they got to their shores they had all kinds of varmint in them, and they were very strict. Has our exporting of this fruit gotten any better and have they relaxed their restrictions on—this is specifically from California? Strawberries were the concern back then.

Mr. DONOVAN. I believe Japan still takes a very, very strict approach to its agricultural inspection activities, and this is one area where our Department of Agriculture, particularly in Tokyo, works very, very closely with Japanese officials. Japan is worried about not only insecticides but also other residuals on American fruit,

One of the things that Japan does if they find a shipment that is in question, they have a tendency to close down at least temporarily all shipments from that particular area, and this is something that we continue to work with Japan on, to open up the market more for U.S. fruits.

Ms. WATSON. Thank you. With respect to trade and the recent Toyota recalls, will Japan's Diet play a role in reassuring American consumers' concern about Japanese autos and what legislative action might they consider?

Mr. DONOVAN. As I look at the Toyota issue, the chairman mentioned it in his remarks, this is essentially a safety issues and I understand our Department of Transportation is playing a leading role in this. I don't anticipate that this will be an issue in our foreign relations with Japan.

Ms. WATSON. It won't rise to that level.

Mr. DONOVAN. But certainly it is a safety issue that we will be dealing with here in the United States.

Ms. WATSON. All right, Mr. Schiffer, much of the discussion around Japan's newly elected government has focused on the relocation of the Futenma base, and the relocation is proposed by the locals and thus is a politically-sensitive issue, and in your testimony you mention that the relocation of this base is just one part of a broader realignment process.

Is there room for United States to compromise to make it politically easier for the Democratic Party of Japan to agree to relocate that base?

Mr. SCHIFFER. Well, we have been consulting closely ever since the new government in Japan was reelected on the Futenma relocation issue. As was discussed earlier, Prime Minister Hatoyama has publicly reaffirmed that his government will make a decision by the end of May based on a thorough review of the options, and that process internal to the Japanese Government is now underway, and we very much respect Japan's right to conduct that review.

There has been no change, in our view, that the realignment road map remains the best plan for reducing the impact on Okinawa while maintaining our alliances capabilities. We are awaiting the outcome of the process that the Japanese Government has undertaken with the three ruling parties to conduct its review of the plan to relocate the Futenma Marine Air Station. We have seen reports in the media, as I am sure you have as well, on any number of alternatives and a great deal of discussion about different options in addition to the current Futenma plan.

We are awaiting the Government of Japan to come to us with any conclusions that they reach in their review and to present any options and alternatives on the table that they think are viable, and when they do so we will certainly continue to discuss with them what we think the best way to go forward is.

Ms. WATSON. Do we still have white beach and I know Kadina is a pretty large air base way back in prehistoric times. I want to know have we reduced the number of forces that we have throughout the island? What about the bases we had way up in the north and southern part of the island? Naha is a big city now, but there were a few bases around there. Have we shifted those around and reduced the size?

Mr. SCHIFFER. Well, part of the goal for the realignment road map overall is to be able to come up with a lighter base footprint both in Okinawa and throughout Japan so that we can adopt to the new situation and the new environment that we find ourselves in. It is a major challenge for us and for the people of Okinawa that we have such heavy population densities in the southern part of the island where many of our bases are located, and that was the starting premise of this process when we started to try to work through these issues with the Japanese Government 10–15 years ago, was the need to figure out ways in which we could relocate bases so that we would have a more sustainable presence on Okinawa.

Ms. WATSON. This will be my last question, Mr. Chairman, if you will allow me the time.

The Riukin Islands themselves, has there been any consideration because I did hear mention that it was a matter of really being

able to grow rice and so on? Were any of the outer islands ever considered for agriculture purposes, to expand to those? I mean, Japan to expand to those islands for agricultural purposes?

Mr. SCHIFFER. You know, I am not familiar if it was, but we will be happy to get back to you.

Ms. WATSON. Well, you know, I understand there are over 600 of those islands, but I don't know if any of them are large enough for agricultural purposes, but I was just curious about that in terms of relocation.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. I thank the gentlelady. The gentleman from California, Mr. Rohrabacher.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Just to follow up on the questions that preceded me.

How many troops are there or how many American personnel are now in Japan, and what is our eventual goal through the efforts that you are making right now?

Mr. SCHIFFER. Well, our eventual goal is the goal that we have right now, which is to assure that we have the capabilities in Japan and in the alliance to be able to, first and foremost, extend credible deterrent capabilities throughout the region.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. And how many people have you determined are necessary for that?

Mr. SCHIFFER. Well, in part, it is, and I have to be evasive here, but in part it is a question of a very dynamic and evolving security environment as you yourself noted.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. We don't have a goal in mind?

Mr. SCHIFFER. And this is one of the reasons why we want to be able to continue with our shift to Guam.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Let me suggest that if you are not able to tell the United States Congress what your goal is, then you shouldn't be in negotiations with a foreign country, and the bottom line is you should let us know what that is. You are obviously not willing to say.

How many marines would be left in Okinawa? We are taking out 8,000. How many marines are going to be left there?

Mr. SCHIFFER. There will be approximately 8,000 marines that will be left in Okinawa.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Okay, so that is about 50 percent. The other 8,000 are going to Guam.

Either one of the witnesses, do you believe that Japan should feel threatened by this massive or this incredible rise in both strength and wealth of mainland China?

Mr. DONOVAN. Yes, sir. First of all, we have welcomed Japan's efforts to improve its relations with all its neighbors, and we are very confident that this will not come at the expense of our own relations or our own interests. Japan has taken some steps in increased frequency of its contacts with China. Japan has a major trading relationship with China has well.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. So is your answer no or yes?

Mr. DONOVAN. My answer is no.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Is what?

Mr. DONOVAN. No.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. So Japan is not being threatened by this expansion of China's military and its massive increase in financial power that we have seen in the last decade.

How about you, do you think Japan should feel a little threatened by that or if we just—All American troops are leaving, China is ever becoming ever stronger, Japan should never worry about that?

Mr. SCHIFFER. Well, I think clearly the rise of China is one of the great challenges that the world faces in the twenty-first century, and what kind of China we see emerge as a player on the global stage is obviously going to be one of the most important strategic facts that will determine what sort of century—

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Right.

Mr. SCHIFFER [continuing]. Our children and grandchildren will live with.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. So you would rather use the word "challenge" rather than "threat"?

Mr. SCHIFFER. Well, I think that it is extraordinarily unclear right now what sort of China is ultimately going to emerge on the world stage. We are extraordinarily cognizant and we pay very close attention, as you know, to China's military modernization programs, and there are areas that we consider to be of great concern when it comes to anti-access and area denial and—

Mr. ROHRABACHER. So the administration is unwilling to suggest that Japan even has to worry about an increased threat, it is an increased challenge, or there is a challenge there. You don't think it is a threat that the Chinese—you don't think it is a threat to Japan that the Chinese are claiming that it is part of their territorial waters way out in the Chinese Sea?

Mr. SCHIFFER. I think we have made it very, very clear to China that we have different views on the international maritime law and their territorial claims.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Okay. Well, you are not willing to do it but I will and say this. Japan better pay attention. There is a threat that is emerging and as long as they have been close to the United States they haven't had to worry about it. Japan has to worry about an ever-more powerful China that is being controlled by a dictatorship. If they are willing to oppress their own people and commit violations of the rights of their own people, Japan has to understand they are not going to worry about the rights of Japanese people.

Do you see that China has played any role in, for example, the development of missiles in Korea? Didn't the Koreans get—North Korea, get any of their technology from China?

Mr. SCHIFFER. I wouldn't claim to be expertise on the genealogy of all of the North Korean—

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Mr. Donovan, how about you, is it your understanding that China may have played some role in the development of North Korean missiles?

Mr. DONOVAN. I am sorry, sir. I don't have any information on that.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Okay. Well, if we are trying to assess, you know, a relationship with Japan, we have got to make sure that we are able to understand what Japan's challenges are and what

their threats are, and maybe it would behoove us, especially when we are trying to negotiate what type of military relationship we are going to have, it might be important for us to fully appreciate what the emergence of a strong and powerful China is going to have in that part of the world, and yes, perhaps the entire world.

Mr. Chairman, thank you very much for your leadership and to directing your attention here. This is a great challenge. You don't want to use the word "threat," but I will, there is a great threat there to both Japan and the United States. Let us not take for granted this relationship that we have had that has preserved the peace all of these years because if we take it for granted at a time when China, this dictatorship in China is emerging, we will all pay a dear price for taking these things for granted. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. FALCOMAVEGA. I thank the gentleman from California. The gentleman from New Jersey for his questions.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much, Mr. Falcomavega, and I appreciate you letting me sit on your panel, and I thank my friend.

Mr. Chairman, as you know the United States has had a long and important relationship with the Japanese on many levels, and both of your distinguished witnesses have pointed it out in their testimonies today.

I was disturbed, however, not to hear either of you mention one of the most pressing issues confronting our bilateral relationship with Japan and that is international child abduction. The State Department and your office, Mr. Donovan, has been contacted by scores of left behind parents. It is difficult to get an exact count as to how many children have disappeared into Japan, but I am told by State Department records show well over 100 American children are currently being held in Japan and have been deprived of love and the protection of their American parent.

Sadly, in the last half century Japan has never once issued and enforced a legal decision to return a single abducted child to the United States. Left behind dads like Patrick Braden, whose daughter Melissa was abducted in 2006 by her mother to Japan, in violation of a Los Angeles Superior Court order giving both parents access to the child, and prohibiting international travel with the child by either parent, has been denied any contact with his daughter.

I would note parenthetically last year I joined Patrick Braden and a group of other left behind parents in a very silent but dignified protest over at the Japanese Embassy. It happened to be Melissa's birthday. They brought a birthday cake. We sang happy birthday to her, knowing that halfway around the world she had no clue that her father was there grieving outside the Embassy of Japan. He is worried sick as well as he believed that they are residing within abusive grandparent, whose abuse has been documented in the court in Los Angeles.

So many other left behind parents, mothers and dads, have contacted my office and wandered the halls of this Congress asking for government help in what has become a diplomatic issue.

I know Japan has been a recipient of at least two demarches from the G-7 nations on international child abductions. Prime Minister Hatoyama himself mentioned before his election that child abductions must be resolved, and I understand that as of December

2009, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs created a new parental rights of children office staffed by nine officials in charge of Europe and America, and hopefully that will yield some results in the coming weeks and months.

We also know, and I would ask you if you would answer this, what have we done in every forum, in every contact with our Japanese interlocutors to raise the issue of abducted children? I mean, this is kidnapping and unfortunately, unless this becomes a government-to-government issue, people like Patrick Braden cannot fight City Hall, just like David Goldman was up against a goliath in Brazil 5 years and counting for him until he finally got his beloved Sean back—and they are now back in New Jersey and doing quite well.

I understand that there is talk of signing the Hague Convention, but as you know, Mr. Donovan, that would do nothing apparently for those people who have already abducted those children and those left behind parents.

Secondly, to Mr. Schiffer, the international movements of our servicemen and women make them especially vulnerable to the risks of international child abduction. Attorneys familiar with this phenomena estimate that there are approximately 25 to 30 new cases of international child abductions affecting our servicemen and women every year.

I am personally acquainted with a few of those victims as well. One victim, Commander Paul Tolland, had his infant daughter abducted by his estranged wife from our military base in Yokohama, Japan, 6 years ago. He claims, and there is no reason not to doubt this, he got very poor advice from the JAG which led to a disastrous outcome in the court. His ex-wife committed suicide well over a year ago, and he still can't get his daughter back from the grandmother.

Another victim, Michael Elias, a marine, is waiting for his two children, Jade and Michael, to return to him from Japan. He met his Japanese wife while stationed in Japan. They later married in United States where both of his children were born. At the end of 2008, his wife abducted their two young children from U.S. soil to Japan in contravention of U.S. court orders and the surrender of the children's passports.

Finally, last year I sponsored an amendment to the Department of Defense Reauthorization, which was signed into law last year, that requires the department to report to Congress by the end of next month, 180 days from October 28, on the number of intra-familial child abductions affecting our service members in the last several years, as well as what the Department of Defense is doing to assist those service members who have suffered an abduction. The report also covers preventative actions taken by the department to stop these child abductions from happening in the first place.

So Mr. Schiffer, if I could ask you, would you tell us what the Department of Defense is doing now on child abduction cases when the left behind parent happens to be a service member, and will the report be delivered on time, and are there any preliminary indications as to what the report has found that you can share us this afternoon?

Mr. FALCOMA. If the gentleman would yield to add onto your question and statement. I am curious about Japanese citizens who are being abducted by the North Koreans. So the feeling can be the same in terms of what they do to our children. But when their citizens are involved, how is the feeling? It is very emotional, and I think they have taken this issue to the highest levels. Even being at the Six-Party Talks, this issue was raised. I just wanted to add that onto the gentleman's question to both of you.

Mr. DONOVAN. Thank you. I agree with you that this is a very important issue that we need to deal with. We have been approaching this on two fronts. The first front, as you mentioned, is in urging the Government of Japan to sign the Hague Convention on International Parental Child Abduction, and Secretary Clinton has raised this in her meetings. Assistant Secretary Campbell has raised it, and Assistant Secretary Janice Jacobs has raised this in her meetings, as well as Ambassador Roos and others, including myself, in visits to Japan, and we are going to continue to press Japan to sign up to the Hague Convention. That is the first part of it.

On the second front, though, as you mentioned, what about the parents, the left behind parents today, what are we doing about them?

We are approaching this on several fronts. First of all, we asked the U.S. Embassy or Consulate where we believe the children are located to attempt to conduct a welfare and whereabouts visit with their children and report back to the left behind parents on their welfare. However, unfortunately, a welfare visit can only take place with permission of the other parent.

We also cooperate with the Office of Children's Issues and works very closely with law enforcement, including the FBI, Interpol, International Center for Missing and Exploited Children. We often reach out to these offices to ensure that they understand the unique circumstances of international parental child abduction and the steps they can take to assist left behind parents and add leverage to their cases.

I might add that recently the State Department has held a series of town hall style meetings for left behind parents here in Washington, DC. These gatherings provide a small group of left behind parents with the opportunity to discuss international parental child abduction in Japan, and to receive updated information on our efforts.

Finally, the embassy in Tokyo has been regularly meeting with left behind parents who aren't able to have access to their children in Tokyo and Japan as well, and we are going to continue these efforts.

Mr. SCHIFFER. Sure. I would just note for our part that more vulnerable or less vulnerable, even one case of a serviceman facing this sort of tragic incident is too many.

As Mr. Donovan noted, we are committed to working with the Government of Japan to address this issue, and the department is likewise committed to ensuring that the service members who face these tragic circumstances have the support that they need.

As far as the report, I will have to check what its status is. As you know, we make every effort to be timely in our responses to

Congress, but I am not sure exactly where that report or any preliminary findings may stand, but we will get back to you on that.
[The information referred to follows:]

WRITTEN RESPONSE RECEIVED FROM MR. MICHAEL SCHIFFER TO QUESTION ASKED
DURING THE HEARING BY THE HONORABLE CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH

We anticipate that the report will come out in late May, at which time it will be released in full. There are no preliminary findings.

Mr. SMITH. If I could, Mr. Chairman. I do hope the report is as comprehensive as it was intended by me and others who backed it, and I also hope that there will be a very proactive response because we do believe that this is an issue that absolutely needs attending to in an aggressive way. There is just too many—I mean, I have met some of these individuals now, and the agony that they face, including some of the members that I know and friends who are worried about an abusive situation, they have nightmares at night wondering what is happening to their little girl while they are halfway around the world.

If you could, Mr. Donovan, you mentioned that these issues have been raised. What has been the response from our Japanese interlocutors?

And secondly, on the welfare and whereabouts visits, do you have a breakdown as to how many of those have succeed and how many of the parents in Japan have blocked such a visit?

Mr. DONOVAN. With regard to your first point, I believe the Japanese Government has stated that they are considering signing up to the Hague Convention but no more than that.

With regard to your second question, I don't have statistics. I am aware of my time in Tokyo where at least one or two of these occurred, but I would say the vast majority of these are declined.

Mr. SMITH. If you could, if it is possible—

Mr. SCHIFFER. Sure.

Mr. SMITH [continuing]. Either get some kind of really clear accounting on that because it would be really helpful to know. In some countries where we have a miserable record of returning those abducted children our embassy personnel at least have had the ability, as in David Goldman's and Sean Goldman's case where the counselor personnel were able to do at least welfare and whereabouts checks, which at least bring some reassurance, and maybe a chilling effect on any abuse or other kind of moving around the country or perhaps even leaving the country.

Again, when our officials, including Secretary Clinton, meet with the Japanese, yes, if they sign the Hague Convention, that is a first step, but that is all it is because as we know many countries certainly do not adhere even after signing on, or even after a MOU with ourselves, but what have they—have they raised specific cases like here is Patrick Braden, here is the situation, here are, you know, some of the others that I mentioned including Michael Elias and Commander Tolland? Do they raise those names and other names because the human rights laws—and as you know I have been doing this for 30 years, I wrote the Trafficking Victims Protection Act—unless you are specific very often everyone deals in generalities, and everybody is with you until they are against you on individual cases. Do they raise the cases?

Mr. SCHIFFER. I believe that they have but I will have to get back to you on that.

Mr. SMITH. Could you please for the record so we know clearly? And if not, I would hope that would change and names would be tendered each time with the background because that does make a difference because these are American parents whose human rights are being grossly violated.

[The information referred to follows:]

WRITTEN RESPONSE RECEIVED FROM MR. JOSEPH R. DONOVAN, JR. TO QUESTION
ASKED DURING THE HEARING BY THE HONORABLE CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH

Due to the sensitivity of the information and our effort to protect the privacy of American citizens, the State Department will submit this information under separate cover.

Mr. SMITH. Finally, and with your indulgence, Mr. Chairman, I have introduced legislation called the International Child Abduction Prevention Act which closely parallels legislation that Frank Wolf and I did in 1998 called The International Religious Freedom Act. I held all the hearings on that. Sadly the State Department was dead set against it until it was law, and then came around, and I think IRFA has been a model of trying to promote religious freedom and to mitigate persecution, and the same goes for the Trafficking Victims Protection Act, of which I was the prime sponsor. It took 2 years to get it enacted into law, and that legislation also was opposed. It was welcomed in theory, in concept, but bitterly opposed because we named names and we had specific penalties for those countries that engage in, as we call it, Tier 1, Tier 2 or Tier 3 egregious abuses.

So this bill is patterned very closely after those two bills. It takes the ambassador-at-large concept. It says a special office would be dedicated, working, God willing, 24/7 to resolve these child abduction cases, and thirdly, would take the exact penalties prescribe under IRFA and apply it to those countries that are showing a "pattern of noncooperation," a term of art that we put into the bill, for child abduction cases. With 2,800 of our children abducted, kidnapped and, you know, about 1,800 or 1,900 parents, of course sibling groups sometimes get abducted, it seems to me the time has come for that legislation. I would hope, you might want to speak to it now, but I would hope the administration would look at that bill and support it and earnestly embrace it.

You know, working on human rights, and Mr. Faleomavaega and I, when I sat there and he was over here, we always worked the human rights issues. Without some kind of penalty phase—our own civil rights laws are testimony to that as well—without a penalty phase we will get agreement in concept every day of the week, but not in actual enforcement, and I think it would give as many additional tools to the Department of State and Defense to effectuate the release of our abducted children.

So with respect, I ask you to take a good look at it and I hope you can support it.

Mr. FALEOMAVEGA. I thank the gentleman for his participation. As I have said, I want to note for the record if there is anyone that I would like to commend and thank as our advocate, our champion as far as human rights are concerned, it is my good friend, the gen-

tleman from New Jersey. And you deserve that commendation, Mr. Smith.

I have got a couple of questions if I may. You know, at the height of the campaign between the Liberal Democratic Party and the Democratic Party of Japan the media was somewhat in a frenzy because there was concern that the Hatoyama administration is going to turn almost a 180-degree turnaround from what has been the practicing policy of the Liberal Democratic Party for the past 50 years.

Of course, Prime Minister Hatoyama has restated basically the fundamental policy, which is as far as our security alliance is concerned between Japan and the United States, it is in no way undermined by this new administration.

However, I note with interest, and correct me, Secretary Donovan, that there seems to be a tremendous interest on the part of the new administration in Japan to reach out to other Asian countries, particularly China. And I was wondering if perhaps the new interest demonstrated by Prime Minister Hatoyama and his administration was due to the fact that it is no longer relying just on the United States for its interests. And I was wondering if there is any truth in media reports that Japan is turning a new leaf, it is a new administration, and it is not going to play ball with the United States, and that it wants to play ball with all the other countries in Asia, especially China. Can you comment on that?

Mr. DONOVAN. Yes, thank you, Mr. Chairman.

As I said previously, United States welcomes Japan's efforts to improve its relations with all of its neighbors. We think that this is a very good thing, and we are very confident that this will not come at the expense of our own relations with Japan or our own interests.

In addition to that, I would call your attention to several statements the Japanese officials have made about the importance that they attach to our alliance. At the time of the signing of the Mutual Security Treaty, the anniversary on January 19th, Prime Minister Hatoyama made a very strong statement in support of our alliance and the value that he places on it. Likewise, Foreign Minister Okada has also said that he attaches great importance to the alliance as we do. For us, of course, it is the cornerstone of our entire engagement, and I think that we are very reassured by the statements that they have made about the importance that they attach to the relationship.

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. If the media reports were accurate concerning Secretary Gate's initial visit to Japan, somewhat badgering the Japanese Government leaders about executing or implementing the provisions of the 2006 realignment agreement that was made by the previous administration, by the Liberal Democratic Party, is that still in place in terms of our demanding that Japan honor this commitment or this agreement that was signed in 2006?

Mr. SCHIFFER. It is still our position that the best way forward on this set of issues and the realignment road map is to implement the realignment road map. It was negotiated, as you pointed out, by the previous administration in Japan and also by the previous administration in the United States.

When the Obama administration came into office, we reviewed the Guam International Agreement, and concluded that the agreement, the logic of the realignment road map was sound, and that is why Secretary Clinton signed the Guam International Agreement and made that part of her first trip to Asia. We were hopeful that the new government in Japan would also come to understand the logic of the Guam International Agreement, but they have, as you know and as we have discussed previously, started a process where they are reviewing that agreement, reviewing different options for the Futenma Replacement Facility, and we await the decision that the Government of Japan may choose to arrive at the options and alternatives that they may put on the table.

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Let us discuss the broader perspective. When you talk about realignment, this goes back to Bush 41 about all our military forces around the world. You know, World War II is over, the cold war is over, we still have 50,000 soldiers in Germany, I believe. Correct me if I am wrong on that, and currently we have 48,000 military in Japan alone, and then 27,000 in Korea, and then under the command of Admiral Willard, some 240,000 marines and sailors under the Pacific Command with some 200 ships.

My point, I wanted to ask Secretary Schiffer, with all due respect to my good friend from California, about the threat that China is imposing. And I don't know if the media reports are accurate, to the effect that China actually is reducing its military budget, while on the contrary, we are increasing our military budget from \$650 billion now to some \$760 billion.

And in addition to that, Secretary Schiffer, and please help me on this, we have a total of 737 military installations both in the United States and outside the United States. Is that true?

Mr. SCHIFFER. I would have to get back to you on the exact number.

[The information referred to follows:]

WRITTEN RESPONSE RECEIVED FROM MR. MICHAEL SCHIFFER TO QUESTION ASKED DURING THE HEARING BY THE HONORABLE ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA

On March 4, 2010, Beijing announced a 7.5 percent increase in its military budget to approximately \$78.6 billion. This increase continues more than two decades of sustained annual increases in China's announced military budget. However, the Department of Defense estimates China's total military-related spending to be much higher (\$150 billion in 2009 using 2009 prices and exchange rates). Estimating actual People's Liberation Army military expenditures is a difficult process due to the lack of accounting transparency and China's still incomplete transition from a command economy. Moreover, China's published military budget does not include major categories of expenditures. The United States and other countries have urged China to increase transparency in military spending.

The Department operates 507 fixed installations in the U.S. and overseas.

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Can you please provide that for the record? I got this from my staff, and they better be right.

Mr. SCHIFFER. I am sure they are.

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. I was told we have 737 military installations both in the United States and around the world. And do you know how many military bases China has outside of China? Zero. Nada. So my question basically is about security interests that we are having here, which raises the next question about Okinawa. I have been to Okinawa. One-point-three million people live there in

Okinawa, and it has become a very sensitive and volatile issue in Japan at this point in time.

It seems that the Okinawans feel like they have always been the whipping boy for the last 50 years where we just put our military people there and not have to worry about it. Is it true that Okinawa is very, very strategically important to our national security interests?

Mr. SCHIFFER. Yes.

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Why?

Mr. SCHIFFER. The simple fact of the matter relates to what we consider to be the——

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Can you be a little louder?

Mr. SCHIFFER. My apologies. The simple fact of the matter relates to what we consider to be the tyranny of distance. Okinawa provides us with a strategic location that allows us to take necessary actions for a range of scenarios. Forces that are based back in the constitution United States, or even in Hawaii, would take a much, much longer time to be able to arrive at a situation be it humanitarian assistance and natural disaster relief, or be it something more severe.

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. I didn't mean to interrupt you there, Secretary Schiffer, but I think we have already proven during the tsunami in Aceh, Indonesia, we were able to mobilize quickly.

Mr. SCHIFFER. And in part the response to that is from our marines in Okinawa.

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. By having all these military when we are not at war, I was just trying to figure, it is costing us—for every 1,000 soldiers we put out there, we have to spend \$1 billion; 30,000 soldiers, that is over \$30 billion; 68,000 soldiers, that is \$68 billion. That is a lot of money.

In your honest opinion, Secretary Schiffer, why do we have to spend \$760-some-billion for our defense?

Mr. SCHIFFER. Well, just speaking about the Asia-Pacific region, as I said in my testimony it is my belief that regional peace, stability, and prosperity is underwritten by the forward deployed presence of U.S. forces in the region, and I think that there would be gravely destabilizing effects if we were to be precipitously pulling out.

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Some of the officials in Beijing were very concerned when we had proposed selling some \$6.4 billion worth of military arms to Taiwan. I turn around and suggested to my friends in China, it is no big thing, but it is just somebody out there trying to make money, and I recall, I think the very thing that President Eisenhower has always given this warning in the 1950s about beware, the military industrial complex that we have in our country where the reason is not so much our defense or our security but it is so that these big military contractors, big companies that make tanks and bullets and guns. Let me ask you this, Mr. Schiffer: Are we the biggest exporter of military arms in the world right now?

Mr. SCHIFFER. I would have to get back to you on exactly what the——

[The information referred to follows:]

WRITTEN RESPONSE RECEIVED FROM MR. MICHAEL SCHIFFER TO QUESTION ASKED
DURING THE HEARING BY THE HONORABLE ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA

According to the Conventional Arms to Developing Nations 2001-2008 report, the U.S. ranked first for arms deliveries worldwide, with \$12.232 billion in 2008.

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Can you? Can you provide that for the record? I am very curious. Please, I am not trying to suggest that I am against defense. Absolutely. I want to make absolutely certain that our security is firm. Can you provide the dollar value of the 48,000 soldiers that we currently have in Japan? How much is it costing us to have all this military hardware and soldiers and sailors and all of them being stationed in Japan?

Mr. SCHIFFER. We can get back to the committee with those figures.

[The information referred to follows:]

WRITTEN RESPONSE RECEIVED FROM MR. MICHAEL SCHIFFER TO QUESTION ASKED
DURING THE HEARING BY THE HONORABLE ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA

It is difficult to produce the exact dollar value of maintaining the Marines in Japan due to a number of indeterminable factors that impact total cost. However, based on Fiscal Year 2009 data, the total approximated U.S. cost of maintaining the Marines in Japan is \$1.4 billion. This figure comprises operations and maintenance (O&M) costs, civilian pay, foreign national indirect hire pay, and military personnel costs. Military personnel costs include basic allowance for subsistence, cost of living allowance, basic allowance for housing, and overseas housing allowance (OHA).

These figures represent the U.S. appropriated portion of these costs only and do not account for any other additional factors, beyond those listed above, that might impact the overall cost. They do not include investment costs in the Marine force structure stationed in Japan.

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Can you also provide the figure, the dollar figure of how much Japan is spending on its military defense? I understand it is in the top three in the world, but I may be wrong. Correct me if I am wrong on that.

Mr. SCHIFFER. Well, part of the challenge here, and again I will get back to you with definitive figures, is that depending upon how you account for spending, different countries rank in different places. But as you know Japan spends less than 1 percent of its GDP on its defense.

[The information referred to follows:]

WRITTEN RESPONSE RECEIVED FROM MR. MICHAEL SCHIFFER TO QUESTION ASKED
DURING THE HEARING BY THE HONORABLE ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA

According to the Japan Ministry of Defense "Outline of Defense-Related Expenditures FY 2010" and "Japan's Defense and Budget" briefings given to U.S. diplomats earlier this year, Japan's 2010 defense budget is \$50.88 billion. This number does not include some items, such as realignment costs for U.S. forces, which are funded elsewhere.

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Well, I keep hearing that but I hear that that 1 percent happens to be also the top three in the world as far as actual dollar value and how much they spend on their bullets and guns and soldiers and sailors. So it may be 1 percent out of what? Ten trillion dollar GDP? How much is Japan's GDP, by the way?

Mr. DONOVAN. I don't have exact figure for you on that. Sorry. I will get back to you.

[The information referred to follows:]

WRITTEN RESPONSE RECEIVED FROM MR. MICHAEL SCHIFFER TO QUESTION ASKED
DURING THE HEARING BY THE HONORABLE ENI F.H. FALEOMAVEGA

It is difficult to produce the exact dollar value of maintaining the Marines abroad due to a number of indeterminable factors that impact total cost. However, based on Fiscal Year 2009 data, the total approximated U.S. cost of maintaining the Marines abroad, including Japan, is \$4.3 billion. This figure comprises operations and maintenance (O&M) costs, civilian pay, foreign national indirect hire pay, and military personnel costs. Military personnel costs include basic allowance for subsistence, cost of living allowance, basic allowance for housing, and overseas housing allowance (OHA).

These figures represent the U.S. appropriated portion of these costs only and do not account for any other additional factors, beyond those listed above, that might impact the overall cost.

Mr. FALEOMAVEGA. Well, right now we are at about \$14 trillion, our own GDP in our country, so I suspect that if Japan is number two—this is just one thing that I have nothing but highest praise and respect for the Japanese people. No natural resources, no oil, no minerals, and yet just by the sheer industry of its people currently now is the second most powerful economy in the world. That to me is a miracle, with only 120 million people living on those islands. I think you have to give credit to the Japanese people and their industry, how they were able to come up with such an economic miracle as far as other countries are concerned. And I think we played a very, very important part in building Japan's economy to where it is now.

Gentlemen, if this thing with the Okinawa situation does not come through say after May, I realize I am being hypothetical about it, Secretary Schiffer, but do we have an option B in place if it doesn't come through?

Mr. SCHIFFER. Well, the only thing that I can really tell you because I would prefer not to speculate on hypotheticals is that we are waiting for the Japanese Government to conclude its review and to come to the table with whatever proposals and ideas that they may have, and then we will sit down with them at that point in time and see what where we end up.

Mr. FALEOMAVEGA. I believe Japan is also one of the biggest investors in China. Secretary Donovan, are you aware of that?

Mr. DONOVAN. Yes, it is.

Mr. FALEOMAVEGA. How much has Japan invested in China currently?

Mr. DONOVAN. Mr. Chairman, I don't have the amount that Japan has invested in China. I do know, however, that Japan is a very large investor in the United States with about \$259 billion invested in the United States, which is about a third of their outward investment. Likewise, the United States has about—I think it is \$79 billion invested in Japan too, so our investment total bilaterally are quite large.

Mr. FALEOMAVEGA. Well, I think I noted earlier not only are they a big exporter to our country, but they also hold some \$769 billion of our debt, so we owe Japan \$769 billion. China is not very far off with \$755 billion and that is over \$1.4 trillion that we are in debt just to these two countries. Is that a good economic picture to feel comfortable with in terms of our economic security?

Mr. SCHIFFER. With regard to Japan, I know that we have a surplus in terms of our service trade with them while I believe in 2008

it was about \$16.8 billion, and this somewhat offset the goods trade deficit that we run with them which is about \$44.8 billion.

Last year I believe we exported about \$51.2 billion in goods to Japan, and that figure is growing and our overall deficit, I believe, is slowly reducing; however, we need to do a better job on it.

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Well, I will say for the record I had the privilege of meeting with Prime Minister Hatoyama along with my colleagues, Congressman Honda from California, and also Congressman Gao, a Stanford graduate. I think that was his biggest mistake. He should have gone to UC Berkeley, where I graduated, but that is okay. I forgive him for that.

Gentlemen, thank you for coming. Appreciate very much your participation. Do you have any closing statements you want to give?

Mr. DONOVAN. No, sir. Thank you very much.

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Secretary Schiffer?

Mr. SCHIFFER. No, sir. Thank you.

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. All right, thank you.

On our next panel we have two distinguished scholars, Dr. Sheila Smith and Dr. Michael Auslin to join us this afternoon.

Dr. Smith is an expert on Japanese politics and foreign policy. She is currently a senior fellow for Japan studies at the Council of Foreign Relations, and Dr. Smith directed the Council of Foreign Relations Regional Security Architecture for the Asia Program. Dr. Smith is also from the East-West Center where in 2007 she specialized in Asia-Pacific international relations and U.S. policy towards Asia. She was also recently affiliated with Keio University in Tokyo where she researched and wrote on Japan's foreign policy toward China and the Northeast Asian region on an Abe Fellowship. She is a member of the faculty at Boston University and received her master's and doctorate from Columbia University in New York. She has written extensively and I am very, very happy to have her join us this afternoon.

Also with us we have Dr. Michael Auslin, the director of Japan studies with the American Enterprise Institute. He was an associate professor of history, senior research fellow at the McMillan Center for International and Area Studies at Yale University before joining the American Enterprise Institute. Dr. Auslin graduated with a bachelor's in foreign service at Georgetown University, a master's at Indiana University and a doctorate at the University of Illinois.

Thank you so much for your patience. I deeply appreciate your taking the time to come and share with us your sense of understanding of what is happening now in Japan and the current relationship existing between Japan and the United States.

Dr. Smith, would you like to proceed?

STATEMENT OF SHEILA A. SMITH, PH.D., SENIOR FELLOW FOR JAPAN STUDIES, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

Ms. SMITH. Chairman Faleomavaega, and other members of the committee, I am delighted to have the privilege to appear before you to discuss United States-Japan relationship.

Japan's historic Lower House election last August is part of the ongoing structural shift in Japan's alternating party responsibility

for governance. This shift in Japanese politics creates new questions for our alliance as well as new demands on policymakers responsible for our alliance management.

The arrival of a viable second party on the electoral scene suggests that Japan's foreign policy will be subject to new types of scrutiny, and perhaps a significant challenge in the legislature. In short, we should expect that Japanese choices for the alliance will need to demonstrate greater salience domestically.

This should not be cause for alarm, however. Good public policies should survive public scrutiny and legislative debate, and the opportunity to engage in Japanese public in our conversation over the future of the alliance agenda is welcome. For too long in the post-war years, Japan's citizens had little access to or understanding of the debates that shape government choices in the alliance with the United States. Moreover, opposition party resistance to a debate over national security made construction legislative oversight on policy difficult.

Today, we live in a different era and the time for a more direct debate in Japan over its security choices and over the requirements of implementing alliance cooperation has come. Given the complexity and the scope of the security challenges we share with Japan today, we need a direct and informed conversation about where the United States and Japan can cooperate and perhaps where we cannot.

On August 30, 2009, the Democratic Party of Japan won a fully majority in the Lower House election, ousting the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) from a nearly half-century of dominance in Japanese politics. With 308 of the 480 seats in the Japanese Parliament the DPJ won a 4-year stint as Japan's ruling party, and is poised to implement its own electoral manifesto, which called for changing the governance practices in Japan.

This summer's Upper House election will reveal how successful this first year of DPJ governance has been in the eyes of the Japanese people. But it is neither foreign policy nor even the relationship with the United States that most concerns Japanese voters. The Democratic Party of Japan campaigned primarily on a domestic policy agenda, including the need for wholesale reform of Japan's public finances and its social insurance infrastructure.

Like the United States, Japan's political leaders are grappling with the consequence of the global economic downturn. The new government will be judged harshly if it cannot attend to the need to boost economic growth and relieve unemployment. From its first weeks in office, the Hatoyama Cabinet actively sought to articulate a new approach to Japan's foreign policy. The Prime Minister's first speech in public in fact was at the U.N. Climate Change Summit where he put forward a forceful statement on Japan's commitment to global efforts to reduce carbon emissions.

Likewise, he spent another day in New York emphasizing his country's embrace of the goal of nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament. From there he traveled to the G-20 meeting to reiterate his government's support for the collective effort to stabilize the global economy. This is a government, in other words, that believes Japan's agenda is global.

During the election campaign, the DPJ advocated an “equal relationship” with the United States and an emphasis on Japan’s Asian diplomacy as a member of the East Asian Community. Yet the impression is that this government seeks to advance its Asian diplomacy at the expense of its bilateral alliance with the United States, and this sensitivity here in Washington has led to concerns over the longer term future of United States-Japan alliance.

But this zero sum understanding of what motivates Japan’s new government underestimates broader social and political currents in Northeast Asia. While building on the deep ties that come from a half-century of security cooperation with Japan, we must also be mindful of the need for new approaches to our alliance cooperation. We cannot afford to assume that our old habits of alliance management will continue to serve a changing Japan.

Let me offer five significant opportunities ahead that if embraced could strengthen and focus our security cooperation with Japan.

First and foremost, we must find an acceptable relocation facility for the U.S. Marine Corps and close Futenma Marine Air Station. Today the issue of Futenma relocation seems all consuming, and this has led many to assume that Japan’s new government seeks to undermine our military cooperation. This is, I believe, a misreading of the sentiments both of the new government toward the alliance but also the Okinawan sentiments regarding the U.S. military presence there.

The complexity and the difficulty of Futenma relocation has been with us for over a decade. Perhaps forgotten today in our focus on the DPJ is that our two governments in 1996 made a promise at the very highest levels to the people of Okinawa. In the aftermath of prefectural outrage of the rape of a 12-year-old child, the United States and Japan moved quickly to reduce the footprint of U.S. forces on this small island. Closing Futenma was an integral part of this response, and the announcement by Prime Minister Hashimoto and the U.S. Ambassador Walter Mondale that this base would be closed met with broad Japanese approval.

As we seek in these coming months to find a compromise solution, I urge our two governments to reflect on the promises made at a time of deep distress. We cannot continue to risk an accident where civilian lives could be at risk, but as importantly, we should not risk the credibility of our promises in the eyes of the Japanese public at a time when the value and the need for our alliance is so immense.

No matter what the politics of the moment look like, United States and Japanese Governments both must remember that the integrity of United States-Japanese alliance will be judged not only on the potential to meet crises from within, but also on the capacity to fulfill promises to the citizens it claims to protect.

Second, and more broadly, the two governments will also need to assess some of the oversight mechanism for managing the U.S. troop presence in Japan. The demand for greater transparency and accountability is part of any democratic nation’s politics. Support for United States-Japan alliance remains strong in Japan, but it is the policy management practices of maintaining 40-some-thousand troops on the ground that needs adjustment.

Japan's governors, for example, articulate the need for a better set of guidelines for managing the environment on and around U.S. military bases. A bilateral discussion on best basing practices could provide the opportunity to strengthen the relationship between U.S. commanders and local communities and satisfying the growing desire for greater government accountability that is part and parcel of Japanese democracy.

Third, and equally important, Tokyo and Washington must review and reconfirm their understanding of the alliance's strategic goals and priorities. The current initiative begun by Secretary of State Clinton and Foreign Minister Okada at their meeting in January provides an excellent venue for exploring assumptions about contemporary security challenges. This would be a good moment to reflect on the strategic goals for United States-Japan alliance set forth in February 2005, and to update our common priorities for alliance cooperation.

The Asia-Pacific region is changing quickly and our security cooperation must attend to these changes. Coupled with this expert review of our alliance agenda, we must also consider carefully the opportunity for President Obama to reach out to the Japanese public in November 2010. A new generation of Japanese is coming into positions of leadership, a generation that has a different understanding both of the past and of the current relationship with the United States. There is a new opportunity here and indeed a new need to revisit our shared histories and re-commit to a shared future.

As we look forward, we should address our past, including an acknowledgement of the painful costs of World War II to both our countries. The President's second visit to Tokyo should be one where he spends time with the Japanese public explaining the importance of the treaty commitments but also highlighting the American commitment to crafting a common future for our two people.

Fourth, to meet the growing demand for collective action in the Asia-Pacific region, United States and Japan must identify ways to strengthen multilateral security cooperation with a broad array of regional partners.

In the past decade, we can see now challenges for governments and for the collective capacity of the countries of the region to cope with significant security challenges. United States, South Korea and Japan have intensified their cooperation on how to cope with the belligerence of North Korea, and this ought to be continued, including our collaboration of ballistic missile defense.

Other opportunities can be found in working closely with Japan and other regional powers on building capacity for disaster relief and humanitarian assistance efforts. Our military's expertise has been amply demonstrated in the region but this can better be integrated into a standing regional capacity that can bring quicker and more focused response efforts.

Finally, and perhaps the most critical task of 2010, we should work closely with the Japanese Government to articulate a common understanding of our respective strategies for global nuclear nonproliferation.

Both Washington and Tokyo would benefit from the development of a U.S.-Japan action plan for supporting global nuclear non-proliferation efforts. As President Obama has noted, the goal of ridding the world of nuclear weapons may not be attained easily or soon, but the path to that goal requires the shared energies and technological superiority of our two societies.

As the only country to have used nuclear weapons and the only country to have experienced their use, the United States and Japan together could offer a powerful partnership in the global effort to ensure our security against those who would proliferate and in mapping out a secure path to reducing our dependence on these weapons.

In other words, the United States and Japan must integrate our nonproliferation goals with our force posture consultations so that the next decades of security cooperation between the United States and Japan reflect our shared vision for working toward a nuclear free world.

Thank you, and I look forward to your questions.

[The prepared statement of Ms. Smith follows:]

“U.S.-Japan Relations: Enduring Ties, Recent Developments”

**Statement by
Dr. Sheila A. Smith
Senior Fellow for Japan Studies
Council on Foreign Relations
Before the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Foreign Affairs
Subcommittee on Asia, the Pacific, and the Global Environment**

March 17, 2010

Chairman Faleomavaega and distinguished Members of the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you to discuss the U.S.-Japan relationship.

Japan’s historic Lower House election last August is part of the on-going structural shift in Japan towards alternating party responsibility for governance. This shift in Japanese politics creates new questions for the alliance, as well as new demands on policymakers responsible for alliance management. The arrival of a viable second party on the electoral scene suggests that Japan’s foreign policy—as well as its domestic policy choices—will be subject to new types of scrutiny and perhaps to significant challenge in the legislature. In short, we should expect that Japanese choices for the alliance will need to demonstrate greater salience domestically.

This should not be cause for alarm, however. Good public policy should survive public scrutiny and legislative debate, and the opportunity to engage the Japanese public in our conversation over the future of the alliance agenda is welcome. Japanese citizens, like American citizens, want to understand the analyses (and the tradeoffs) that underpin their government’s security and foreign policy choices. As the environment surrounding Japan changes, the need for a public better informed of the costs and benefits of Japan’s security choices grows.

For too long in the postwar years, Japan’s citizens had little access to, or understanding of, the debates that shaped government choices in the alliance with the United States. Sensitivities over the past, and strong support for the “no war” clause in the Japanese constitution, made full and informed policy debate in Japan over security policy choices difficult. Likewise, our policy dialogue with Tokyo on security cooperation was perhaps too accommodating to former government sensitivities about making public the analysis that informed their choices.

Moreover, opposition party resistance to a debate over national security made constructive legislative oversight on policy difficult. Japan’s parliament was too contested a venue for discussing the details of policy choices. Rather it was the stage for articulating deeply contentious differences in interpretation over the meaning of Article 9 for Japan’s military development, and policy oversight by opposition parties more often than not took the form of a demand for greater civilian control over state security planning.

Thus, civil servants sought to protect alliance policymaking from the gaze of critical domestic interests in an effort to ensure smooth military cooperation. Many of Japan's choices in its relationship with the United States, particularly around sensitive issues regarding U.S. forces stationed in Japan, were thus not given full public scrutiny. As important to today's debate in Japan over the substance of U.S.-Japan security cooperation outlined in the so-called "*mitsuyaku*"—or secret agreements—investigated by Foreign Minister Okada, these choices often seemed to be made at the bureaucratic level rather than by the top political leadership. While most countries tread gingerly in publicizing their national security preparations, this lack of transparency has added meaning in postwar Japan where deep sensitivities remain over the latitude given to military and civilian planners.

Today, we live in a different era—and the time for more direct debate in Japan over its security choices and over the requirements of implementing alliance cooperation has come. Given the complexity and the scope of the security challenges we face today, we need a direct and informed conversation about where the United States and Japan can cooperate—and where we cannot.

The questions being raised in Japan today call for an even greater understanding between Americans and Japanese on such complex topics as the rise of China and India, the incentives for nuclear proliferation, and the economic consequences to all of us from the current economic crisis. The United States and Japan seek to work alongside each other not simply in ensuring that we meet the obligations of our bilateral security treaty, but also in trying to devise strategies for national security that meet the changing demands of the day.

Japan's New Government: Domestic Priorities and Governance Reform

On August 30, 2009, the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) won a full majority in the Lower House election, ousting the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) from a nearly half-century of dominance in Japanese politics. With 308 of the 480 seats in the Japanese parliament, the DPJ won a four-year stint as Japan's ruling party, and is poised to implement its electoral manifesto, which called for changing the governance practices in Japan. This summer's Upper House election will reveal how successful this first year of DPJ governance has been.

High on its list of reform is the relationship between Japan's politicians and the bureaucrats. Capitalizing on public antipathy towards Japan's once highly-respected bureaucracy, the DPJ hopes to put politicians at the top of the government as the main decision makers. Some changes seem cosmetic—no bureaucrats are allowed to testify in parliamentary hearings, for example—but some could be of major import—such as the creation of a National Strategy Council under the prime minister's office to formulate long-term national economic and foreign policy goals. Needless to say, these efforts to redesign the balance of power within the Japanese state will take years to implement.

It is neither foreign policy nor even the relationship with the United States that concerns most Japanese voters. The Democratic Party of Japan campaigned primarily on a domestic policy agenda, including the need for wholesale reform of Japan's public finances and its social insurance infrastructure. Like the United States, Japan's political leaders are grappling with the

consequences of the global economic downturn and the shocks of the financial crisis of 2009. Political change in Tokyo also affects economic policymaking, however, and the new government will be judged harshly if it cannot attend to the need to boost economic growth and relieve unemployment.

The first real policy challenge that confronted the new DPJ government was Japan's budget. A supplementary budget prepared by the previous cabinet was revamped, and added to that was the formulation "from the bottom up" of Japan's fiscal year 2010 budget (April 2010-March 2011). Cooperation by the Ministry of Finance helped the new ruling party reorder the national budgetary priorities. In addition, the introduction of public hearings on government spending forced bureaucrats to justify and to refine their line-item spending requests. These public hearings were televised throughout Japan, and the sight of nervous bureaucrats responding to pointed questions by a committee of DPJ policy-savvy politicians struck a responsive chord among the Japanese public. Theatrics notwithstanding, Japan's FY2010 budget came in at a whopping 92.299 trillion yen (\$1.015 trillion), the highest ever as the DPJ sought to stimulate economic growth.

This week major economic indicators offer encouraging signs about the recovery of the Japanese economy, yet concerns remain about deflation. Moreover, the longer term task of revamping the state's fiscal health is also a significant challenge. The new political leadership in Japan understands that it must deal with Japan's worsening fiscal health, and the new National Strategy Council has been tasked with the first step towards that goal. Finance Minister Naoto Kan announced that it would create a mid-term fiscal reform plan by June this year. But the details have yet to be announced, and the economy remains vulnerable to factors beyond Japan's control. Critical decisions in the months ahead made not in Tokyo but in Beijing and in Washington, for example, could make it difficult for Japan to sustain its fragile recovery.

The early months of the DPJ government were welcomed by the Japanese public—expectations were high and public approval ratings stayed at around the 70% mark. However, public support for the new government has since fallen. The *Asahi Shimbun* reported on March 16, 2010 a decline in the prime minister's approval rate (down five points from last month to 32%) but more importantly a rising rate in numbers of Japanese who disapprove of the fledgling DPJ government (47%). The Hatoyama cabinet has lost public confidence in large part due to allegations against the DPJ's powerful secretary general, Ichiro Ozawa, and the prime minister himself for improper handling of campaign funds. Prosecutors have decided they have insufficient evidence to indict Mr. Ozawa. But this scandal overshadowed the first weeks of legislative debate, and distracted the new government from debate the Japanese public was waiting for on the new government's budgetary choices and economic growth strategy.

Japan's Diplomacy: A New Agenda?

From its first weeks in office, the Hatoyama cabinet has actively sought to articulate its approach to Japan's foreign policy. The prime minister's first speech in public, in fact, was at the United Nations Climate Change Summit where he put forward a forceful statement on Japan's commitment to global efforts to reduce carbon emissions. Likewise, he spent another day in New York emphasizing his country's embrace of the goal of nuclear nonproliferation and

disarmament. From there he traveled to the G-20 meeting to reiterate his government's support for the collective effort to stabilize the global economy. This is a government that believes Japan's agenda is global, and in the prime minister and foreign minister, Japan has at the top of its government individuals committed to and actively engaged in working collectively to address the world's problems.

During the election campaign, the DPJ advocated an "equal relationship" with the United States and an emphasis on Japan's Asian diplomacy as a member of the East Asian Community. This party believes strongly in protecting the spirit of Japan's postwar constitutional ban on the use of force for the settlement of international disputes, and has a clear disarmament and nonproliferation agenda. This has raised issues not only for U.S.-Japan defense cooperation, but also for the policies related to the stationing of U.S. forces in Japan.

This year marks the 50th anniversary of the U.S.-Japan security treaty, and President Obama's second visit to Tokyo in November 2010 for the APEC meeting is widely seen as an opportunity to lay out a new alliance agenda for the future. But the ability of this new government and the Obama administration to cooperate on security issues may be tested on issues such as the anticipated UN Security Council discussion on sanctions for Iran, and on the effort to get North Korea back to the negotiating table in the regional Six Party Talks.

The new government's approach to its relationship with China has raised some eyebrows. The notion of an East Asian Community as articulated by Prime Minister Hatoyama remains vague, but his undiplomatic statements to Chinese leaders that Japan has been dependent on the United States for too long have some in Washington worried. There is widespread support in Japan for the idea that Japan should have closer relations with its East Asian neighbors. Indeed, this reconciliation has long been a significant aim in its diplomacy. Yet, the impression is that this government seeks to advance its Asian diplomacy at the expense of its bilateral alliance with the United States, and this sensitivity has led to concerns over the longer-term future of the U.S.-Japan alliance. The dramatic visit by Ichiro Ozawa to Beijing in December accompanied by an entourage in the hundreds (including almost 100 newly-elected DPJ parliamentarians) seemed an overt effort to seek favor with Beijing.

But this zero-sum understanding of what motivates Japan's new government underestimates broader political and social currents in Northeast Asia. Support for energizing regional diplomacy in Northeast Asia is gaining momentum. The energized trilateral summitry between Japan, South Korea and China that began at the end of 2008 is more likely to be the focus of the new government's policy attention. For many in Northeast Asia, this effort to craft a common agenda of cooperation between these three important neighbors is long overdue, and to date the agenda has included consultations on financial regulatory practices, North Korea, humanitarian relief efforts, and recently the more delicate topic of historical reconciliation. Cooperation on the environment will also be high on the region's agenda. The next meeting is expected in May, and there is also talk of increasing bilateral summit talks between Japan's prime minister and the leaders of China and South Korea, respectively.

Northeast Asia today must be the context within which we consider our future with Japan. If we are to succeed in getting Asia right in our diplomacy, we cannot afford to be oblivious to the

changes underway in the society that we ought to know best. We must understand how the rapidly growing influence of China is affecting regional security perceptions, and we must move carefully with Tokyo in mitigating the effects of North Korean belligerency. While building on the deep ties that come from a half century of security cooperation with Japan, we must also be mindful of the need for new approaches to our alliance cooperation. We cannot afford to assume that our old habits of alliance management will continue to serve a changing Japan. A changing Japan does not threaten our interests—it provides new opportunities for our two governments to reflect and improve upon those practices that serve us well. It also offers new insights into what can be—and what should be—as we look ahead for the next decade or more.

Opportunities Ahead for the United States and Japan

The new government in Tokyo has instituted reforms that have created challenges for the United States and Japan in thinking about the future of this partnership. A key issue that plagues Prime Minister Hatoyama and his cabinet has been the relationship with the United States. The tension with Washington over the relocation of a U.S. Marine Corps air base in Okinawa prefecture has erupted into a significant domestic political standoff with local politicians there. The 2006 plan to relocate helicopters to a new runway to be built in Nago, a northern part of Okinawa, has stalled as the Hatoyama government reviews the decision making of its predecessors.

The prime minister's decision to postpone this issue until after local elections prompted speculation that the DPJ is more interested in future electoral victories than in sustaining cooperation with the United States on basing policy. But, in the wake of the Nago City mayoral election on January 24, there is also a growing sense in both Washington and Tokyo that the existing plan is politically too difficult to implement. Thus we are preoccupied at the moment with this significant policy challenge of finding a new home for the U.S. Marine helicopters currently stationed in Futenma.

We must not allow ourselves to become consumed with this one issue. Our alliance relationship with Japan demands a broader lens—and a more thoughtful overhaul—if it is to demonstrate its salience for the next generation of Japanese and Americans. We must organize our policy cooperation with Japan for a more complex regional environment—and we must do it in a way that allows our policy coordination and cooperation to reflect changing responses to this environment. Let me offer some suggestions on the opportunities ahead that if embraced could strengthen and focus our security cooperation with Japan in the years ahead.

First and foremost, we must find an acceptable relocation facility for the U.S. Marine Corps and close Futenma Marine Air Station.

Today, the issue of Futenma relocation seems all-consuming on our bilateral agenda in these first months of working with the new DPJ government, and this has led many to assume that Japan's new government seeks to undermine our military cooperation. This is a misreading of the sentiments—both of the new government towards the alliance but also of the Okinawan sentiments regarding Futenma relocation. The complexity—and the difficulty—of finding a replacement facility for U.S. Marine helicopters currently assigned to Futenma predates the advent of the DPJ government. The best of our defense and foreign policy professionals in both

governments have sought to find a solution to this dilemma, and millions have been spent by both governments in examining the feasibility of relocation options. Futenma is only one base in a broad realignment effort, which if implemented will provide a solid foundation for military cooperation in the decades ahead.

Perhaps forgotten today in our focus on Nago City is that our two governments in 1996 made a promise—at the highest levels—to the people of Okinawa. In the aftermath of prefectural outrage over the rape of a 12-year-old child, the United States and Japan moved quickly to reduce the footprint of U.S. forces on this small island. Closing Futenma was an integral part of this response, and the announcement by Prime Minister Hashimoto and the U.S. Ambassador Walter Mondale that this base in the highly-populated central region of the island would be closed met with broad approval not only in Okinawa but across the country. Yet, 13 years later our two governments are still haggling over the question of where to put the U.S. Marine helicopters, and our collective inability to find a solution is beginning to diminish the sense that we can work together.

As we seek in these coming months to find a compromise solution, I urge our two governments to reflect on the promise made at a time of deep distress. We cannot continue to risk an accident where civilian lives could be at risk, but as importantly, we should not risk the credibility of our promises in the eyes of the Japanese public at a time when the value and the need for our alliance is so immense. No matter what the politics of the moment look like, the U.S. and Japanese governments both must remember that the integrity of the U.S.-Japan alliance will be judged not only on the potential to meet crises from without but also on the capacity to fulfill promises to the citizens it claims to protect.

Second, and more broadly, the two governments will also need to assess some of the oversight mechanisms for managing the U.S. troop presence in Japan.

The demand for greater transparency and accountability is part of any democratic nation's politics, and in virtually every area of public policy, our governments are expected to respect the public's rights to ask questions about priorities, procedures and policy choices. Support for the U.S.-Japan alliance remains strong in Japan. But it is the policy management practices of maintaining 50,000 troops on the ground that needs some adjustment. Like many other societies that host U.S. military forces, there is a sense that the needs of local communities are not getting the attention they deserve. Japan's governors, for example, articulate the need for a better set of guidelines for managing the environment on and around U.S. military bases. Obligated by local law to monitor and manage natural resources, governors in prefectures hosting U.S. military bases run into unique obstacles to the implementation of their obligations. Domestic law and the Status of Forces Agreement do not mesh well on the task of environmental management, and this needs greater attention. Thus, a bilateral discussion of the past practices of cooperation in hosting U.S. military forces in Japan could provide the opportunity to strengthen the relationship between U.S. commanders and local communities, and satisfy the growing desire for greater government accountability that is part and parcel of Japanese democracy. Incorporating local governors in the conversation would be a crucial first step to ensuring that the local impacts of the U.S. military are fully accommodated in national policy decisions.

Third, and equally important, Tokyo and Washington must review and reconfirm their understanding of the alliance's strategic goals and priorities, but do so in a manner that reflects the long-standing aspirations of the Japanese people for peaceful relations with their neighbors.

The current initiative begun by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and Foreign Minister Katsuya Okada at their meeting in Honolulu in January provides an excellent vehicle for exploring assumptions about contemporary security challenges. This would be a good moment to reflect on the strategic goals for the U.S.-Japan alliance set forth in February 2005, and to update our common priorities for alliance cooperation. The Asia-Pacific region is changing quickly, and our security cooperation must attend to these changes. Coupled with this expert review of our alliance agenda, we must also consider carefully the opportunity for President Obama and Prime Minister Hatoyama to reach out to the Japanese public in November 2010.

Much of what is lost in the current conversation over our political relationship is the generational change that is so obvious in both our countries. A new generation of Japanese is coming into positions of leadership in Japan, a generation that has a different understanding both of the past and of the current relationship with the United States. There is a new opportunity here—and indeed a new need—to revisit our shared histories, and to recommit to a shared future. As we look forward, we should address our past, including an acknowledgment of the painful costs of World War II to both our countries. The president's second visit to Tokyo should be one where he spends time with the Japanese public, explaining the importance of the treaty commitments but also highlighting the need to renew and reinvigorate the American commitment to crafting a common future for our two people. This should be a time when our diplomatic history is celebrated, but also a time for sharing our common aspirations for the future with the American and Japanese people.

Fourth, to meet the growing demand for collective action in the Asia-Pacific region, the United States and Japan must identify ways to strengthen multilateral security cooperation with a broad array of regional partners.

The growth in multilateral conversations within the region over regional security and economic cooperation is of great benefit to the construction of a greater sense of community among the diverse countries of the Asia Pacific. But in the past decade, we can also see new challenges for governments, and for the collective capacity of the countries of the region to cope with the significant challenges to their populations. The United States, South Korea and Japan have intensified their cooperation on how to cope with the belligerence of North Korea, and this ought to be continued, including our collaboration on ballistic missile defense. Policy cooperation among the countries of Northeast Asia has produced a greater sense of common interest than in any previous time.

Other opportunities can be found in working closely with Japan and other regional powers on building capacity for disaster relief and humanitarian assistance efforts. Our military's expertise has been amply demonstrated in the region, but this can be better integrated into a standing regional capacity that can bring quicker and more focused response efforts. We could begin by examining bilaterally our needs and capabilities for joint regional disaster relief facilities and

training, and identifying bilateral opportunities for civilian and military cooperation in disaster and humanitarian relief beyond the Asia Pacific, such as we saw in Haiti.

Finally, economic prosperity in the Asia Pacific demands safe maritime transport of goods and energy resources. The United States has a common interest in anti-piracy cooperation with the countries of the region, and particularly with Japan. Our maritime cooperation should be extended and enhanced to include the ASEAN countries as well as the coalition of partners now working in the Gulf of Aden off the coast of Somalia. Maritime security for the economies of the Asia Pacific is vital, and the stretch of maritime waters from East Asia to South Asia constitute a broad area for much needed consultations and cooperation among our governments, and multilateralizing our maritime cooperation—both civilian and military—would be an essential first step in building regional maritime cooperation. Our ability to work with the countries of the Asia Pacific begins with Japan, and should be a foundation for building regional capacities that will ensure the continued stability of this vibrant maritime region.

Finally, and perhaps the most critical task of 2010, we should work closely with the Japanese government to articulate a common understanding of our respective strategies for global nuclear nonproliferation efforts.

This year will be a seminal year for clarifying our own thinking on extending nuclear deterrence to regional allies, and on examining how to continue to ensure our cooperation on the UN Security Council Resolution 1874 on curtailing North Korean proliferation. Likewise, this year will be crucial to international cooperation on persuading Iran to end its proliferation activities, and Japan can be a considerable partner in this effort. Finally, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review this year offers yet another instance of critical behavior for both of our countries as we grapple with the increasing proliferation pressures and our global capacities for preventing the spread of nuclear weapons.

Both Washington and Tokyo would benefit from the development of a U.S.-Japan action plan for supporting global nuclear nonproliferation efforts. As President Obama has noted, the goal of ridding the world of nuclear weapons may not be attained easily or soon, but the path to that goal requires the shared energies and technological superiority of our two societies. As the only country to have used nuclear weapons and the only country to have experienced their use, the United States and Japan together could offer a powerful partnership in the global effort to ensure security against those who would proliferate and in mapping out a secure path to reducing our dependence on these weapons. In our relationship with Japan, the time has come for clarity in our thinking about the need to proffer extended deterrence to Tokyo—the world's most prosperous and influential non-nuclear power. We should begin to focus our planning attention on the lessons learned from our cooperation bilaterally and via the UN Security Council on responding to proliferation on the Korean peninsula. We must also continue to work closely to integrate our policy goals for coping with Iran. In other words, the United States and Japan must integrate our nonproliferation goals with our force posture consultations so that the next decades of security cooperation between the United States and Japan reflect our shared vision for working towards a nuclear-free world.

Mr. FALEOMAVEAGA. Thank you, Dr. Smith. Dr. Auslin.

STATEMENT OF MICHAEL AUSLIN, PH.D., DIRECTOR OF JAPAN STUDIES, THE AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE

Mr. AUSLIN. Mr. Chairman, thank you for inviting me to testify today on the state of U.S.-Japan relations.

This past January Washington and Tokyo observed the 50th anniversary of United States-Japan alliance, one of the most successful bilateral agreements in recent history. Yet this time of celebration has been clouded by short-term political strain between Tokyo and Washington, and longer term concern over the strength of our transpacific relationship.

The state of U.S.-Japan ties directly influences the larger strategic position of the United States in the Asia-Pacific region; hence, any substantive change in United States-Japan alliance or in the political relationship that undergirds it would present challenging questions for U.S. policymakers.

We face today a new and unfamiliar situation in Japan, one which offers great opportunities, yet also engenders difficulties and anxieties. Last August Japanese voters ousted the Liberal Democratic Party after a half-century of nearly continuous power. The electoral victory of the Democratic Party of Japan was the reflection of trends that have been reshaping Japanese society for decades and leading to deep currents of unease. Yet the DPJ has found governing more difficult than electioneering, and has unexpectedly found itself in a tussle in Washington over 2006 agreement to move Marine Corps Air Station Futenma to a more remote location on Okinawa.

The DPJ itself is an uneasy coalition of ideological opposites, from former socialists to pro-alliance realists, and Washington should be prepared for continuous debates within the DPJ in coming months over foreign and domestic policy as well as the likelihood of leadership changes in the party that may push it in different directions.

I believe the doubts about Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama's overall commitment to U.S.-Japan relations are overstated, but Mr. Hatoyama clearly sees a different future for United States-Japan relationship than his predecessors did. We should take seriously his desire for Japan to play a more expansive global role, craft a closer relationship with the nations of East Asia, and take a lead in birthing a new East Asian Community.

Japan today is working through a daunting mounting of problems from economic reform to the continuing North Korean nuclear and missile threat, and the new government has yet to come up with concrete policies to deal with many of them. I would suggest, however, that the Hatoyama administration is following many previous LDP policies, including attempting to play a leading role on climate change issues, participating in Asian multilateral initiatives, and continuing its anti-piracy operations off the Horn of Africa.

There is little in these policies that indicate a turning away from the United States, and indeed may portend greater cooperation with Washington on shared global issues. None of this, however, should come at the expense of the continued close security and po-

litical relations we share with Japan. Many have noted statements by Prime Minister Hatoyama about the decline of American power in the world in the rise of China as well as his criticisms of globalization and market-based economics.

Fears that Mr. Hatoyama plans on drawing closer to China at the expense of the United States may worry some American observers, and I would share those concerns if in coming days indeed saw a downgrading of the working relationship between Tokyo and Washington, and any indication that Tokyo saw increasing benefit in moving closer to China on issues ranging from trade to security. Yet we must also respect the choices of a democratically-elected government and recognize that current trends and Japanese policy-making, including Japan's recent outreach to China, reflect a return to a more traditional Japanese position of attempting to maintain some level of balance in its foreign policy.

Japanese opinion leaders and policymakers continue to worry that the United States will over time decrease its military presence in the Asia-Pacific and that Washington will consider China in coming decades as the indispensable partner for solving problems both regional and global.

Despite such problems, United States-Japan alliance remains the keystone of U.S. policy in the Asia-Pacific region. America and Japan share certain core liberal values that tie us together and which should properly inform and inspire our policies abroad. Further, within the continued Japanese hosting of U.S. forces, our forward-based posture in the Western Pacific is untenable. Maintaining this presence is a full-time job for officials on both sides of the Pacific, and we will see continued, sometimes difficult negotiations on alliance issues in the years ahead.

It is clear, however, that our friends and allies in the area are keenly attuned to our forward-based posture and any indications that the United States was reducing its presence might be interpreted by both friends and competitors as a weakening of our long-standing commitment to maintain stability in the Pacific. We should not underestimate the influence of our alliance with Japan on the plans and perceptions of other nations in the region.

As we look to the kind of Asia that we hope develops in the future, the role of a democratic Japan should become increasingly important, and United States-Japan alliance, although under strain today and still in need of further restructuring, will be indispensable in ensuring our country's commitment to the Asia-Pacific and in providing a necessary stabilizing force to the powerful tides of nationalism, competition, and distrust in that region.

Our relationship with Japan is indeed a cornerstone of the liberal international order that has marked the six decades since the end of World War II as among the most prosperous and generally peaceful in world history. For that reason, among others, we should look forward to maintaining it for years to come.

Thank you, and I look forward to your questions.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Auslin follows:]

“U.S.-Japan Relations: Enduring Ties, Recent Developments”

Testimony before the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Asia, the Pacific, and the
Global Environment

By

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Director of Japan Studies and Resident Scholar in Foreign and Defense Policy Studies,
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March 17, 2010

Room 2172

Rayburn House Office Building

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, thank you for inviting me to testify today on the state of U.S.-Japan relations and a new era in Japanese politics. This past January, Washington and Tokyo observed the 50th anniversary of the U.S.-Japan Alliance, one of the most successful bilateral agreements in recent history. Yet, what all observers assumed would be a time of unvarnished celebration has been clouded by short-term political strain between Tokyo and Washington and longer-term concern over the strength of our trans-Pacific relationship. The state of U.S.-Japan relations concerns not only the economic relations between the world's two largest economies, but directly influences the larger strategic position of the United States in the Asia-Pacific region. Hence, any substantive change in the U.S.-Japan alliance or in the political relationship that undergirds it would present challenging questions for U.S. policymakers.

All political relationships change, and that between Japan and the United States is no exception. Policymakers on both sides of the Pacific have continually adjusted the alliance to reflect national interests, capabilities, and perceptions of the strengths of each other. But the strategic realities of maintaining a forward-based U.S. presence in the western Pacific have been intimately tied to the domestic political policies of successive Tokyo and Washington administrations. This is where we face today a new and unfamiliar situation in Japan, and which is the source of much of the current difficulties and anxieties in both capitals.

Last August, Japanese voters ended the rule of the Liberal Democratic Party after fifty-four years during which it held power nearly continuously. For Japan, Asia's oldest and most stable democracy, this was a change of epochal proportions. The proximate cause of anger voter was the inability of the Liberal Democrats to end Japan's nearly two-decade long economic slump, which has seen the country's once unstoppable business sector stagnate, develop unevenly, and lose ground to emerging exporters such as China and South Korea. Numerous scandals and being out of touch with the voters also doomed the LDP and encouraged Japanese to cast their ballots for change.

Yet the electoral victory of the Democratic Party of Japan was the reflection of trends that have been reshaping Japanese society for decades and leading to deep currents of unease. These include worries over Japan's falling population rate and demographic decline, the supplanting of permanent employment by temporary jobs, the shrinking number of married couples and families, and a pervasive sense of isolation from its neighbors and indeed the world. A two-decade period of stagnation, at the very time that China has burst on to the world scene economically, politically, and militarily has added to the frustration of Japanese officials and citizens alike. In certain ways, these concerns have highlighted the importance of the relationship with the United States even as some have questioned the wisdom of continuing to tie Japan so closely to America.

The Democratic Party of Japan capitalized on these dissatisfactions and fears to win a resounding electoral victory. Their election "manifesto" spoke directly to Japanese voters, promising a new era of politics, in which business interests would be supplanted by citizen interests, in which creating an equitable economy would supercede a focus on

corporate balance sheets, and in which Japan would privilege promoting global peace over unreflectively maintaining its status-quo relationship with the United States. Yet the DPJ has found governing more difficult than electioneering, and has unexpectedly found itself, as well, in a tussle with Washington over a 2006 agreement to move Marine Corps Air Station Futenma to a more remote location at Camp Schwab on Okinawa. Given that the DPJ itself is an uneasy coalition of ideological opposites, from former Socialists to pro-alliance realists, Washington must be prepared for continued debates within the DPJ in coming months over foreign and domestic policy, and the likelihood of leadership changes at the top of the party that may push it in different directions and potentially create further instability in Japanese politics.

For the United States, Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama's desire to consider a different location for the Futenma base has raised questions about his administration's overall commitment to U.S.-Japan relations. Such concern is overstated, I believe, but Prime Minister Hatoyama does have a different vision of the future of the U.S.-Japan relationship than did his predecessors. His repeated assertions that the alliance remains at the core of Japan's security policy is to be taken at face value, but so should his desire for Japan to play a more expansive global role, craft a closer relationship with the nations of East Asia, and take a lead in birthing a new East Asian Community, no matter how vague the specifics of his plan. With respect to the narrower issue of the Futenma relocation, the current Japanese administration has until now been equally influenced by the necessity to maintain its coalition with the Social Democratic Party in the Upper House of the Japanese Diet as has been by a desire to listen to the voices of the people of Okinawa and reduce the Marine Corps burden on that island, which, ironically, the 2006 agreement was crafted to do.

Unfortunately, however, the Futenma issue has been folded into larger questions about Mr. Hatoyama's foreign policy, thus raising doubts about the DPJ's commitment to maintaining the U.S.-Japan relationship as the most important one for both countries in the Pacific region. Hence the attempts to understand whether Prime Minister Hatoyama's repeated calls for a more "equal" alliance with Washington mean more "independent"; such equality probably looks different depending on whether one is in Foggy Bottom or the Pentagon, let alone in Tokyo or Washington. Much of the worry in the U.S. government comes from the newness of the DPJ and the inherent uncertainties in dealing with any government that does not have a track record we can interpret and use for predictions. Such, I may add, is a constant source of concern among Japanese at our presidential transitions, so we are, perhaps, now finding ourselves in Japan's shoes for the first time in over half a century.

Much of the change in Tokyo that concerns U.S. policymakers stems from the DPJ's desire to do business differently than its predecessor. I would suggest, however, that in many ways, the Hatoyama Administration is following paths trod by recent LDP governments. While it is true that decisions are being made by a smaller circle of DPJ officials around Prime Minister Hatoyama, that continues a trend set by former premier Junichiro Koizumi last decade. Thus, the Cabinet Office is taking a more direct role in policymaking, and is subordinating the role of the bureaucrats, which worries those in

Washington used to decades of working with officials from the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Finance, and Defense. Similarly, the current focus on previously secret agreements between President Nixon and Prime Minister Sato with regard to the transport and/or introduction of nuclear weapons on Japanese territory in times of crisis has been explained to many observers as a fulfillment of the DPJ's promise to air controversial policy decisions in public, and not necessarily the harbinger of a change in position.

Japan today is working through a daunting mountain of problems, from economic reform to the continuing North Korean nuclear and missile threat, and the new government has yet to come up with concrete policies to deal with many of them. However, Prime Minister Hatoyama has made clear some of his foreign policy goals, and we should not automatically view those through a zero-sum prism, in which purportedly new Japanese policies are held to be detrimental to American or traditional U.S.-Japan interests. Thus, following on from previous Liberal Democratic cabinets, the Hatoyama Administration hopes to play a leading role on global climate change issues, including the development and spread of green technologies and the curbing of its own greenhouse gas emissions. In lieu of continuing its eight-year old refueling mission in the Indian Ocean in support of U.S.-led antiterrorism operations, Tokyo has indicated it will provide up to \$5 billion in civilian support for Afghanistan, thus maintaining its role in reconstruction efforts. The DPJ further has indicated its support for current anti-piracy operations off the Horn of Africa, and may consider increasing Japan's contingent of escort ships and P-3C reconnaissance planes.

Similarly, Prime Minister Hatoyama's call for the creation of a new East Asian Community should be viewed in the light of Japan's long-time, active participation in APEC and in ASEAN processes, including the East Asian Summit. And on the still painful issue of war guilt and responsibility, the new government has indicated its desire to consider removing the memorial tablets of war criminals from Yasukuni Shrine and work jointly with South Korea and China on a new history textbook. There is little in these policies that indicate a turning away from the United States, and indeed may portend greater cooperation with Washington on shared global issues.

None of this, however, should come at the expense of the continued close security and political relations we share with Japan. Of deeper possible concern, then, are statements by Prime Minister Hatoyama about the decline of American power in the world and the rise of China, as well as his criticisms of globalization and market-based economics. These indications of a possibly radical shift in Japan's global orientation have been underscored by the DPJ's outreach to China, and the recent visit orchestrated by DPJ Secretary General Ichiro Ozawa, perhaps the most powerful member of the ruling party. Mr. Ozawa has visited Beijing previously with large delegations, and his December 2009 visit with a party of 600 included nearly half of the DPJ's parliamentary bloc, over 140 elected officials. Both Messrs. Ozawa and Hatoyama have talked about improving relations with Beijing, and such a position is natural for any politician whose country's largest trading partner is China. Last November, the Japanese and Chinese governments agreed to hold their first joint military training exercise. Yet most Japanese also feel some level of concern over China's growing military capabilities and influence in the

Asia-Pacific region, and many question whether the DPJ's approach might wind up weakening relations with the United States, leaving Japan with less leverage to shape Chinese policies in the region.

This may worry some American observers, too, and I would share those concerns if coming days indeed saw a downgrading of the working relationship between Tokyo and Washington, and any indication that Tokyo saw increasing benefit in moving closer to China on issues ranging from trade to security. Yet we must also respect the choices of a democratically elected government, especially that of an ally, and recognize that any reduction in political tensions between Japan and China is of general benefit to the region. It was scarcely five years ago, we should remember, that Chinese mobs attacked Japanese consulates and businesses in Shanghai and other cities.

Here, I believe current U.S. expectations of Japanese policy may be overly influenced by the short, yet intense, period of post-9/11 cooperation between our two countries. The personal commitment of Prime Ministers Koizumi and Abe to supporting U.S. strategy in Asia and the Middle East led to policies that were tempered by their successors. If anything, current trends in Japanese policymaking, including Japan's recent outreach to China, reflect a return to a more traditional Japanese position that attempts to maintain some level of balance in Japanese foreign policy.

Relations are further influenced, despite the laudable efforts of U.S. officials here and in Tokyo, by the continued worry of Japanese opinion leaders and policymakers over long-term trends in America's Asia policy, thereby fueling part of their interest in China. I will mention perhaps the two main concerns: first, that the United States will, over time, decrease its military presence in the Asia-Pacific, thereby weakening the credibility of its extended deterrence guarantee, and second, that Washington will itself consider China in coming decades as the indispensable partner for solving problems both regional and global. Both these concerns exist despite repeated U.S. assurances that our military presence will not shrink, and despite the very public problems cropping up in Sino-U.S. relations in recent years. Ironically, perhaps, these Japanese concerns almost exactly mirror U.S. worries, from frustrations over Japan's continued reluctance to increase its security activities abroad to our casting a wary eye on exchanges between Beijing and Tokyo.

Despite this litany of problems both real and perceived, the U.S.-Japan alliance, and the broader relationship it embodies, remains the keystone of U.S. policy in the Asia-Pacific region. There is little doubt that America and Japan share certain core values that tie us together, including a belief in democracy, the rule of law, and civil and individual rights, among others, which should properly inform and inspire our policies abroad. Moreover, after the cataclysm of World War II, we have worked together to maintain stability in the western Pacific, throughout the Cold War and after. Without the continued Japanese hosting of U.S. forces, our forward-based posture is untenable, particularly in a period of growing Chinese military power in which the acquisition of advanced weapons systems indicates increased vulnerability of U.S. forces over time.

There are over 35,000 U.S. military personnel in Japan, and another 11,000 afloat as part of the 7th Fleet, while three-quarters of our military facilities are in Okinawa. Maintaining this presence is a full-time job for officials on both sides of the Pacific. Both Washington and Tokyo have revised the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) governing the U.S. military in Japan to respond to local concerns over judicial access to U.S. service members, and domestic pressures to reduce Japan's \$4 billion annual Host Nation Support (HNS) are a continuing feature of bilateral discussions. The new Japanese government has indicated its desire to consider further revision of SOFA and HNS, which portends continued, sometimes difficult negotiations between both sides, though I would be surprised by any significant changes in either.

It is clear, however, that the presence of U.S. military forces is welcomed by nearly all nations in the Asia-Pacific region and sends a signal of American commitment to the region. From a historical standpoint, the post-war American presence in the Asia-Pacific has been one of the key enablers of growth and development in that maritime realm. And today, for all its dynamism, the Asia-Pacific remains peppered with territorial disputes and long-standing grievances, with few effective multilateral mechanisms such as exist in Europe for solving interstate conflicts. Our friends and allies in the area are keenly attuned to our continued forward-based posture, and any indications that the United States was reducing its presence might be interpreted by both friends and competitors as a weakening of our long-standing commitment to maintain stability in the Pacific. The shape of Asian regional politics will continue to evolve, and while I am skeptical of what can realistically be achieved by proposed U.S.-Japan-China trilateral talks, it seems evident that we must approach our alliance with Japan from a more regionally oriented perspective, taking into account how our alliance affects the plans and perceptions of other nations in the region.

Beyond these traditional security concerns, Japan and the United States continue to be among the handful of countries that can act as significant first responders to humanitarian disasters, and did so jointly during the Boxing Day tsunami of 2004 and are doing so today in Haiti. Both our countries are leaders in scientific research and development, and bred multinational corporations that continue to change the nature of global commerce. Economically, of course, we are increasingly intertwined. Our bilateral trade last year was over \$132 billion worth, making Japan our fourth largest trading partner even despite a fall of nearly \$80 billion in trade from 2008, and Japanese companies in 49 states employ approximately 600,000 Americans. Japan is also the world's largest purchaser of U.S. Treasuries, currently holding over \$768 billion worth, more than China's official portfolio of \$755 billion in American securities.

The heady days of the 1980s are long over for Japan, when pundits breathlessly proclaimed it the next superpower. Japan, however, will continue to play a major role in Asia over the next decades, as that region continues to be the engine of global economic growth. Similarly, the role of a democratic Japan should become increasingly important in Asia as democracies young and old continue to evolve, while authoritarian and totalitarian regimes oppress their own people and threaten others.

As we look to the kind of Asia that we hope develops in the future, there is much that continues to commend Japan to the region's planners and peoples. Much in the same way, the U.S.-Japan alliance, though under strain today and still in need of further restructuring, plays a currently indispensable role in ensuring our country's commitment to the Asia-Pacific and in providing a necessary stabilizing force to powerful tides of nationalism, competition, and distrust in that region. Our relationship with Japan is indeed a cornerstone of the liberal international order that has marked the six decades since the end of the Second World War as among the most prosperous and generally peaceful in world history. For that reason, among others, we should look forward to maintaining it for years to come.

Thank you.

Mr. FALCOMA. Thank you, Dr. Auslin. Thank both of you for your most eloquent statements. Just wanted to ask a couple of questions.

On your statement, Dr. Smith, you mentioned that with the whole advent of the campaign that took place between the Democratic Party of Japan and the Liberals, as you mentioned, the focus really was on the issues that were local and not foreign policy or international economics. And I suspect one of them was the economy and the other was corruption, and it was so astoundingly strong as a result of the campaign that took place.

You had mentioned also something about Prime Minister Hatoyama's views concerning nonproliferation. What is your understanding of Japan's position on this? Either of you can comment on that.

Ms. SMITH. I would be delighted to, Mr. Chairman.

I think, first of all, on the campaign, those of us who are Japanese politics watchers, we have been anticipating the election of last August for several years now, and so sooner or later this election was going to happen. The question was a question of timing. As we watched the campaign unfold it was very, very clear that the huge agenda that the DPJ wanted to challenge the LDP on was domestic, and in particular, as I am sure you are aware, Japan's aging society, the future fiscal burdens of that on the Japanese state, and how its policies differed from that of the Liberal Democrats in managing things like medical care, pensions, tax policies, et cetera.

So there was very little, and we all looked to the manifestos put out by the DPJ, in fact there was very little on there about foreign policy, very cursory statements, as I alluded to in my testimony, but not a fully developed policy platform that we would expect from a leading contending party in an election.

So I think many of us were holding our breath and waiting to see. There was some clarification in the summer before the election in August, but we still didn't understand what the language of "equal relationship with Washington" meant. We didn't understand what "embracing East Asian Community" meant, and I think the party is working out in its own mind some of the choices and pragmatic decisions it will have to make in accordance with that rhetoric as it has had to govern.

On your second question about nonproliferation, I think Prime Minister Hatoyama's speech at the United Nation lays out very clearly some very long-held aspirations of the Japanese people, to be a force for nonproliferation, to work actively with other partners on the global stage through the MPT and in other venues to eliminate nuclear weapons. This has been a goal of the Japanese people throughout the half-century of the post-war people, and I think they continue to feel strongly about this.

We have two venues now in United States-Japan Alliance to work with Japan on this whole nonproliferation. One clearly is North Korea and the Six-Party Talks, there is another emerging, a conversation to be had in Iran, I believe, in the United Nations Security Council, and I think Japan's role in that conversation will be very, very important. So there is a place, I think, for the United

States and Japan to overlap in terms of working toward a common goal.

Mr. FALEOMAVEGA. Which adds another question, and I will get to Dr. Auslin. How do you denuclearize a country like North Korea when it already has nuclear bombs? I mean, where we are constantly on Iran because Iran still has not yet developed a nuclear weapon, but North Korea already has. Is it something of a contradiction, Dr. Smith?

Ms. SMITH. No, and I am sure Dr. Auslin would like to jump in here. No, it is not. I think part of our challenge here is the instruments that we try to use to persuade Pyongyang. I am not sure at the moment whether the Six-Party venue and that persuasive context of regional diplomacy will yield results. Clearly, the Bush administration and then the Obama administration felt that the Six-Party regional framework was one particular place to work with other countries of north East Asia, but the reality is containment of the proliferation of North Korea is also on the agenda, and working with our allies, South Korea and Japan, has been a very important part of that aspect of trying to deal with North Korea.

It is not denuclearization, it is containment at the stage that we are at right now.

Mr. FALEOMAVEGA. Well, I will have Dr. Auslin jump in just for a minute, but I have been following the nonproliferation issue for a number of years. I call it full of contradictions, somewhat hypocritical too in the fact that it is okay for the five permanent members of the Security Council to continue to hold onto thousands of nuclear weapons, but it is not okay for the rest of the world to have possession of nuclear bombs.

India went outside of the basket, is it called a basket? Went outside of this idea that you are not supposed to have bombs, or they went ahead and exploded one in 1974, and then Pakistan followed, all this outside of the nonproliferation pressure from the United Nations and the five permanent members.

Do you see any sense of imbalance here in how we advocate as members of the United Nations that we should do everything we can to get rid of nuclear weapons altogether and yet—and yet this is since 1974? I remember the Prime Minister of India, Rajiv Ghandi, made an appeal before the General Assembly of the United Nations saying, hey, look, we can explode one too, and then asked the United Nations, particularly the five permanent members, our country included, are we serious about getting rid of nuclear weapons all together, because we are willing to do it? Well, guess what? Total silence since 1974, and we are still faced with this problem of nuclear weapons.

How serious are we really about nonproliferation? Because now, even in our own country, a tremendous debate going on about the validity of deterrence. We need to continue to have the bomb just in case. I think we should take on President Reagan's adage "trust but verify."

Dr. Auslin, you must have all the answers to my questions.

Mr. AUSLIN. Mr. Chairman, I think you have actually raised a key point in relation to Japan's own tensions within its policy, which is, as Dr. Smith indicated, the aspirational goal of a world

without nuclear weapons and certainly before that to have a robust and effective nonproliferation regime.

With what Japan and Japanese policymakers have long recognized is the reality of the U.S. nuclear umbrella that Japan understands the world that it lives in, the neighborhood that it lives in. Certainly it has watched with at least some alarm the growth over the past several decades of Chinese capabilities in medium- and long-range ballistic missiles and its nuclear forces.

Japanese officials, I know, Mr. Chairman, as you are well aware, continually ask U.S. counterparts about the credibility of our nuclear umbrella, and so the attempt to square those two issues, how you can work for a world and hope for a world in which there are no nuclear weapons, but in the short term recognize that in some way your existence is tied to a credible deterrent is one that as of this point they have found no answer to.

I think that Prime Minister Hatoyama is very sincere in his beliefs, but my own feeling on this is that in coming decades, as it seems certain that more countries around the world will get their hands on nuclear weapons as the nonproliferation regime breaks down, what you will probably see in Japan is the maintenance of this aspiration but a much more hard-hearted approach and realistic approach to working with the U.S. on maintaining a credible deterrent, and that, I think, was actually reflected in the secret agreements that we had back in the 1970s, in a very unstable period as well.

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Dr. Smith, you mentioned something about Okinawa. I have some questions about Okinawa, and I think it is going to become a very volatile issue in the coming months or weeks, depending which way the Hatoyama administration is going to turn on this issue.

As I had asked Secretary Schiffer, suppose that Japan does decide that we are to leave Okinawa, and I mean not just continue having the other 8,000 marines, but just take our total military presence out of Okinawa. I know that is a hypothetical question, but suppose it does happen. Suppose that the 1.3 million people in Okinawa are sick and tired of having a military presence in their land, and the leaders themselves agree. Of course, that does raise a problem for Prime Minister Hatoyama. But what would this mean for us in terms of our options, and is that really going to compromise our own security if the Okinawa situation turns not so much to our expectations?

Ms. SMITH. Well, Mr. Chairman, it is a very important question, and I think we can go back for a bit of a prelude to 1995 and the prefectural outrage at that point, I mentioned the rape of the child. It was a very intense opposition to the U.S. military presence. It was a very intense opposition to the management of that presence, particularly in Okinawa, to the Status of Forces Agreement, everything about the U.S. military presence in Okinawa was up for grabs.

I think what both of our governments understood at that moment was that it needed the highest level of political attention. What pains me somewhat a decade or so later is that we have somehow lost the immediacy of the need to deal with the promises made to the Okinawa people.

I don't believe right now in the prefecture there is antagonisms toward U.S. military or anti-Americanism per se, but I think there is an expectation that both of our governments will live up to the promise that was made such a long time ago.

The question of the relocation of Futenma has been very, very focused on the relocation site, and what I wanted to remind the committee and others listening is there is another end of that, and that is to close this marine air station in a densely populated part of Okinawa. My understanding of the politics at the moment in Okinawa is that is also the sentiment. Futenma needs to be closed. A relocation site needs to be found.

There are some difference in the prefecture about the acceptability of some of the options being put forward. I believe that Henacal, the current option that the U.S. Government feels is the best compromise solution may no longer be politically viable, but again I do think we have to watch the political process in Tokyo and Okinawa unfold somewhat before we can make a judgment.

U.S. forces serve in host societies at the request of the government and the people of those societies. So to get back to your very original question, if the U.S. Marine Corps is asked to leave, the U.S. Marine Corps will need to leave, but I do not believe that this government in Tokyo or even the Okinawan people at this particular moment want all of the U.S. forces to leave. But I think we are in very difficult waters if we are not able to solve this problem effectively and with due attention to the sensitivities in Okinawa.

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. And you can join in, Dr. Auslin. But I want to add the 48,000 presence of the military in Japan for the defense of Japan, and I was just wondering if this is somewhat a relic from World War II and the cold war. Do we still need 50,000 soldiers stations in Japan?

This is an entirely new situation there, and I think Secretary Schiffer and I may have a little difference of opinion here about how quickly we were able to mobilize when we had that tsunami in Aceh, Indonesia. In a matter of hours we have capabilities in C-17s, and C-5s, in a matter of hours we can mobilize, but just the fact that 48,000 soldiers live there, is the issue really more economic than it is security or military?

I mean the host country really is the beneficiary for us paying. Of course, there is burden sharing involved here with Japan. I don't know how it is in Germany, but I am still wondering if 50,000 soldiers in Japan are needed for the defense of Japan or whether 1 million soldiers in China. How do you defend Japan against a totally imbalanced view as far as—I am not a genius in military strategy and all of that, but can you help us on this, Dr. Auslin?

Mr. AUSLIN. You have raised a number of important questions, Mr. Chairman. I would say first on the burden-sharing issue, Japan does pay host nation support, something on the order of \$3 billion a year, and as Secretary Schiffer's testimony pointed out, it is not to be seen in simply payment terms but as an investment in the overall nature of the relationship. So the cost that we do have by having our 48,000 service members over there is offset to a large degree, I would say, by host nation support.

But I think the questions that you raise, the strategic questions, are the truly important ones. Dr. Smith mentioned, going back to

1995, I would go back to 1990–91 I think it was when the Government of the Philippines asked us to close our bases there, both Clark and Subic, our naval and air bases. And so the first answer to your question, what would happen is I presume what happened——

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. And you know the reasons why the Filipinos kicked us out of Subic Bay and Clark Air Force Base, right?

Mr. AUSLIN. Well, some of what was reported I certainly know.

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Well, the reason was that as far as the Filipinos were concerned our presence in the Philippines wasn't to protect the Filipinos, it was to protect Japan. That was the debate in the Philippines Senate, and that was the reason why we were told to leave.

Mr. AUSLIN. Well, I think the views in the Philippines have certainly evolved over the years, and in my understanding, and clearly we left at that point in time. So the first answer to your question is we would undoubtedly respect the wishes of the Government of Japan.

The question is what happens after that. I think that is the easy part of this is leaving. What happens after that, and that is what you indicated. In the Philippines there are many voices today that talk about what type of expanded cooperation they can have with United States because the issue of the presence of U.S. forces is not merely, and I think you point out correctly, what can 48,000 troops do against 2.4 million Chinese troops, the issue is perception and the issue is the effect on the calculations of other actors.

What we saw in Southeast Asia in that period was a steady increase in Chinese claims over territories and what came up earlier in this hearing, South China Sea areas, in the bilateral problems that nations in Southeast Asia had with each other once the United States was not there as a southern anchor, which is not to say we solved every problem, but it does change the geo-political calculation.

So in answer to your question what would happen if we left Northeast Asia, the resolution of issues would fall solely upon the nations in the region who have an unfortunate and long history of distrust, of continued use of the history to obstruct future progress, and in which undoubtedly due to our general position we would be drawn back in anyway, but without the resources and the means to have the same level of effectiveness as we do if we are there in the region as we are now.

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. And also the understanding if we do leave our presence out of Southeast Asia it will leave a vacuum, it will probably force Japan and China then to compete to an extent where all other Asian countries are going to be living in fear in terms of what exactly—who would you rather be partnership with than the United States if that be the case; at least that is what I understand as to why many Asian countries really would like to continue to have U.S. presence in the Asia-Pacific region.

You heard earlier the comments made by Secretary Schiffer and Secretary Donovan. Nothing like having the foreign policy and the military both at one time so we can kind of get an idea what is going on.

In both of your opinions, and understanding the situation in Japan, do you see any real serious breakdown or division between our two countries, between Japan and the United States?

Ms. SMITH. No, sir, I don't. But that being said I think how we manage the Futenma issue I think will set the tone of our relationship for years to come, and that is where I worry. I think the deep interests on both sides, both economic and security, and our common democracies won't ensure that we have a very strong partnership, but I think the way we handle the Futenma location issue I think has to respect the democratic process in Japan, and has to respect also our ability to work effectively with Japan on a broad range of security-related issues.

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Dr. Auslin?

Mr. AUSLIN. I would second that, Mr. Chairman. The only thing I would add is my concern that if we do not handle it well, as Dr. Smith indicated, that it will be, I think, a natural result that certainly on our end we may choose to put this relationship somewhat on the back burner. The government and Secretary Schiffer and Donovan have other areas that they are concerned with. They have an enormous portfolio. Everyone in the government is overloaded with keeping up with their responsibilities, and to enter into a situation where you do not feel that the return on investment of time and effort is adequately repaid, despite the longstanding and remaining interests between the two countries as there are, nonetheless I think would potentially lead to a situation of benign neglect where we may just allow the relationship to settle down to a lower level of importance and ultimately we would be faced with other problems arising out of that, and that is the key concern that I have.

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Some of the members of our committee have expressed that concern, and if history serves as the basis of letting us know that that has happened a couple of times where we seem to have neglected Japan, not only input advice, or to counsel. The one thing I would say, that this administration is very, very strong in dealing with the Asia-Pacific region. At least we can say that this President—I always say he is the first President that at least knows where the Pacific Ocean is.

But I will say to both of you I deeply appreciate your coming here to testify, and sincerely hope that we will have other occasions that we can do this. Thank you very much for both of you coming.

Did you have any closing statements you would like to make?

Mr. AUSLIN. No, sir.

Ms. SMITH. No, sir, other than to share with you the importance of the Asia-Pacific region for the United States and for us to continue working hard to understand the dynamics there. Thank you for having us.

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Thank you. The hearing is adjourned.

[Whereupon at 4:53 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

A P P E N D I X

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SUBCOMMITTEE HEARING NOTICE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
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**SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIA, THE PACIFIC AND THE GLOBAL
ENVIRONMENT**

Eni F. LL. Faleomavaega (D-AS), Chairman

March 10, 2010

TO: MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS

You are respectfully requested to attend an OPEN hearing of the Subcommittee on Asia, the Pacific and the Global Environment, to be held in Room 2172 of the Rayburn House Office Building:

DATE: Wednesday, March 17, 2010
TIME: 2:30 p.m.
SUBJECT: U.S.-Japan Relations: Enduring Ties, Recent Developments

WITNESSES: **Panel I**
Mr. Joseph R. Donovan, Jr.
Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary
Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs
U.S. Department of State

Mr. Michael Schiffer
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian & Pacific
Security Affairs (East Asia)
U.S. Department of Defense

Panel II
Sheila A. Smith, Ph.D.
Senior Fellow for Japan Studies
Council on Foreign Relations

Michael Auslin, Ph.D.
Director of Japan Studies
The American Enterprise Institute

NOTE: Witnesses may be added.

By Direction of the Chairman

The Committee on Foreign Affairs seeks to make its facilities accessible to persons with disabilities. If you are in need of special accommodations, please call 202/225-5021 at least four business days in advance of the event, whenever practicable. Questions with regard to special accommodations in general (including availability of Committee materials in alternative formats and assistive listening devices) may be directed to the Committee as noted above.

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS

MINUTES OF SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIA, THE PACIFIC AND THE GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT

Day: Wednesday
 Date: March 17, 2010
 Room: 2172 Rayburn House Office Bldg.
 Start Time: 2:42 p.m.
 End Time: 4:54 p.m.

Recesses:

Presiding Member(s): Chairman Eli H. Faleomavaega

CHECK ALL OF THE FOLLOWING THAT APPLY:

Open Session X
 Executive (closed) Session
 Televised
 Electronically Recorded (taped) X
 Stenographic Record

TITLE OF HEARING: "U.S.-Japan Relations: Enduring Ties, Recent Developments"


COMMITTEE MEMBERS PRESENT: Ranking Member Manzullo, Rep. Watson, Rep. Royce, Rep. Rohrabacher, Rep. Inglis

NONCOMMITTEE MEMBERS PRESENT: Rep. Smith (NJ)

WITNESSES: Same as meeting notice attached? Yes X No (If "no", please list below and include title, agency, department, or organization.)

ACCOMPANYING WITNESSES: (include title, agency, department, or organization, and which witness the person accompanied.)

STATEMENTS FOR THE RECORD: (List any statements submitted for the record)
 Chairman Faleomavaega, Ranking Member Manzullo, Rep. Smith (NJ), Rep. Watson, Mr. Donovan (witness), Mr. Schiffer (witness), Dr. Smith (witness), Dr. Austin (witness)


 Lisa Williams
 Staff Director

Statement/Questions
Rep. Chris Smith
U.S.-Japan Relations: Enduring Ties, Recent Developments
Subcommittee on Asia, the Pacific, and the Global Environment

The United States has had a long and important relationship with the Japanese on many levels, as you have pointed out in your testimonies. I was disturbed, however, not to hear either of you mention one of the most pressing issues confronting our bilateral relationship with Japan—that of international child abduction. The State Department, and your office, Sec. Donovan, has been contacted by scores of left behind parents. It is difficult to get an exact count of how many children have disappeared into Japan, but I am told State Department records show well over 100 American citizen children being currently held in Japan and deprived of the love and protection of their American parent.

Sadly, in the last half century, Japan has never once issued and enforced a legal decision to return a single abducted child to the United States. Left behind dads, like Patrick Braden, whose daughter, Melissa, was abducted in 2006 by her mother to Japan in violation of Los Angeles Superior Court order giving both parents access to the child and prohibiting international travel (or travel to Japan) with the child by either parent has been denied any contact with his daughter. Last year, I participated outside the Japanese Embassy on his daughter's birthday—we sang her Happy Birthday. Mr. Braden is worried sick as he believes they are residing with an abusive grandparent. So many other left behind mothers and fathers have contacted my office, and wandered the halls of congress, asking for government help in what has become a diplomatic issue.

I know Japan has been the recipient of at least two demarches from G7 nations on international child abductions. Prime Minister Hatoyama himself mentioned before his election that child abductions must be resolved. Please tell us what is being done to establish a mechanism to return currently abducted children, as well as to encourage Japan toward ratifying the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction?

And for Sec. Schiffer, the international movements of our service men and women make them especially vulnerable to the risks of international child abduction.

Attorneys familiar with this phenomena estimate that there are approximately 25-30 new cases of international child abductions affecting our service men and women every year.

I am personally acquainted with a few victims. One victim, Commander Paul Toland, had his infant daughter abducted by his estranged wife from our military base in Yokohama, Japan, 6 years ago. His ex-wife committed suicide well over a year ago, and he still cannot get his daughter back from the Grandmother. It is a situation parallel to David Goldman's quest to reclaim his son—after more than 5 years—from Brazil.

Another victim, Michael Elias—a Marine—is waiting for his two children, Jade and Michael, Jr., to be returned to him from Japan. He met his Japanese wife while stationed in Japan. They later married in the U.S., where both of his children were born. At the end of 2008, his wife abducted their two young children from U.S. soil to Japan in contravention of a U.S. court order and the surrender of the childrens' passports.

Last year, I sponsored an amendment to the FY 2010 Department of Defense Reauthorization that requires the Department report to Congress by the end of next month (180 days from Oct. 28) on the number of intra-familial child abductions affecting our service members in recent years, as well as what the Department of Defense is doing to assist those service members who have suffered an abduction. The report should also cover preventative actions taken by the Department to stop these child abductions from happening in the first place.

Last year, over 48,000 military personnel were deployed in Japan. Sec. Schiffer, would you tell us what actions the DOD is taking on child abduction when the left behind parent is a service member, and will the report be conveyed to Congress on time?

Finally, Sec. Donovan, I would like to ask for your support of legislation I have written to combat international child abduction—H.R. 3240. This legislation, like the International Religious Freedom Act and the Trafficking Victims Protection Act, would create an Ambassador-at-Large position for International Child Abduction. It would also form a fully-resourced and expanded office in the State Department to handle international child abduction. And, it would create a set of economic and other sanctions the President could use against countries that demonstrate a “pattern of non-cooperation” in resolving cases of international abduction. I hope I can count on your support.

